爱沙尼亚IVXV网络投票系统的UC建模与安全性分析
UC Modelling and Security Analysis of the Estonian IVXV Internet Voting System
摘要：
自2005年以来，爱沙尼亚在全国范围的选举中使用互联网投票。然而，该系统最初是以启发式方式设计的，几乎没有经过验证的安全保证。爱沙尼亚互联网投票系统多年来一直在不断发展，最新版本（代号IVXV）于2018年实施。然而，迄今为止，尚未对该系统进行正式的安全分析。在这项工作中，第一次，我们提供了一个严格的安全建模爱沙尼亚IVXV系统作为一个仪式，试图捕捉到的效果，实际的人类行为对选举可验证性的通用可组合性（UC）框架。基于从爱沙尼亚的三个实际选举事件收集的选民行为统计数据，我们表明，IVXV实现端到端的可验证性在实践中，尽管只有$4\%$（平均）的爱沙尼亚选民审计他们的选票。
英文摘要：
Estonian Internet voting has been used in national-wide elections since 2005. However, the system was initially designed in a heuristic manner, with very few proven security guarantees. The Estonian Internet voting system has constantly been evolving throughout the years, with the latest version (code-named IVXV) implemented in 2018. Nevertheless, to date, no formal security analysis of the system has been given. In this work, for the first time, we provide a rigorous security modeling for the Estonian IVXV system as a ceremony, attempting to capture the effect of actual human behavior on election verifiability in the universal composability (UC) framework. Based on the voter behavior statistics collected from three actual election events in Estonia, we show that IVXV achieves end-to-end verifiability in practice despite the fact that only $4\%$ (on average) of the Estonian voters audit their ballots.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
