Vivienne:WebAssembly中密码实现的关系验证
Vivienne: Relational Verification of Cryptographic Implementations in WebAssembly
摘要:
本文探讨了使用关系符号执行来对抗WebAssembly程序中的定时侧通道。我们设计并实现了Vivienne,一个开源工具,可以自动分析WebAssembly加密库的恒定时间违规行为。我们的方法具有利用WebAssembly和自动定理证明器的结构的各种优化,包括通过关系不变量支持循环。我们评估了Vivienne在57个真实世界的加密实现,包括一个以前未经验证的HACL* 库在WebAssembly中的实现。结果表明Vivienne是WebAssembly中密码库的恒定时间分析的实用解决方案。
英文摘要:
This paper explores the use of relational symbolic execution to counter timing side channels in WebAssembly programs. We design and implement Vivienne, an open-source tool to automatically analyze WebAssembly cryptographic libraries for constant-time violations. Our approach features various optimizations that leverage the structure of WebAssembly and automated theorem provers, including support for loops via relational invariants. We evaluate Vivienne on 57 real-world cryptographic implementations, including a previously unverified implementation of the HACL* library in WebAssembly. The results indicate that Vivienne is a practical solution for constant-time analysis of cryptographic libraries in WebAssembly.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。