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arXiv 2109.01104cs.CRcs.NI
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DNS放大的另一面:从互联网核心追溯DDoS攻击生态

The Far Side of DNS Amplification: Tracing the DDoS Attack Ecosystem from the Internet Core

Marcin Nawrocki, Mattijs Jonker, Thomas C. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch

摘要:

在本文中,我们通过研究补充数据源并得到正交方法的支持,为DNS放大生态系统提供了新的见解。首先,我们介绍了一种针对互联网核心的被动攻击检测方法,互联网交换点(IXP)。令人惊讶的是,IXP和蜜罐观察到的攻击大多是不相交的:96%的IXP推断的攻击对一个相当大的蜜罐平台是不可见的。其次,我们通过研究IXP痕迹与来自独立测量基础设施的不同数据联合评估观察到的DNS攻击的有效性。我们发现,攻击者有效地检测到新的反射器,并有目的地在它们之间旋转。与此同时,我们发现攻击者距离带来显着更高的放大因子(14倍)只有一小步。第三,我们通过研究攻击痕迹中的模式来识别和识别主要攻击实体。我们发现,该实体通过执行59%的攻击来主导DNS放大生态系统,并对其行为进行了深入分析。最后,我们的研究结果显示,各种.gov名称的运营商不遵守DNSSEC密钥翻转的最佳实践,这加剧了放大潜力。我们可以将这种操作行为与滥用和攻击者决策联系起来。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we shed new light on the DNS amplification ecosystem, by studying complementary data sources, bolstered by orthogonal methodologies. First, we introduce a passive attack detection method for the Internet core, i.e., at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs). Surprisingly, IXPs and honeypots observe mostly disjoint sets of attacks: 96% of IXP-inferred attacks were invisible to a sizable honeypot platform. Second, we assess the effectiveness of observed DNS attacks by studying IXP traces jointly with diverse data from independent measurement infrastructures. We find that attackers efficiently detect new reflectors and purposefully rotate between them. At the same time, we reveal that attackers are a small step away from bringing about significantly higher amplification factors (14x). Third, we identify and fingerprint a major attack entity by studying patterns in attack traces. We show that this entity dominates the DNS amplification ecosystem by carrying out 59% of the attacks, and provide an in-depth analysis of its behavior over time. Finally, our results reveal that operators of various .gov names do not adhere to DNSSEC key rollover best practices, which exacerbates amplification potential. We can verifiably connect this operational behavior to misuses and attacker decision-making.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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