激励攻击下基于事务选择策略的DAG协议PHANTOM和GHOSTDAG
DAG-Oriented Protocols PHANTOM and GHOSTDAG under Incentive Attack via Transaction Selection Strategy
摘要：
为了应对单链PoW区块链固有的处理吞吐量瓶颈，有几个提议已经用单链代替了有向无环图（DAG）。在这项工作中，我们研究了两个显着的DAG为导向的设计。我们专注于PHANTOM（及其优化GHOSTDAG），它提出了一个自定义的事务选择策略，可以提高网络的吞吐量。然而，相关的工作缺乏一个彻底的调查角落的情况下，偏离协议的交易选择策略。因此，我们构建了一个自定义模拟器，扩展了开源模拟工具，以支持多个链，并使我们能够调查这种角落的情况。我们的实验表明，与诚实的矿工相比，偏离所提出的交易选择策略的恶意行为者获得了更多的利润。此外，它们对PHANTOM（和GHOSTDAG）的处理吞吐量有不利影响，因为相同的交易包含在不同链的多个块中。最后，我们发现，不遵循交易选择策略的多个矿工被激励创建一个共享的矿池，而不是独立挖矿，这对去中心化产生了负面影响。
英文摘要：
In response to the bottleneck of processing throughput inherent to single chain PoW blockchains, several proposals have substituted a single chain for Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). In this work, we investigate two notable DAG-oriented designs. We focus on PHANTOM (and its optimization GHOSTDAG), which proposes a custom transaction selection strategy that enables to increase the throughput of the network. However, the related work lacks a thorough investigation of corner cases that deviate from the protocol in terms of transaction selection strategy. Therefore, we build a custom simulator that extends open source simulation tools to support multiple chains and enables us to investigate such corner cases. Our experiments show that malicious actors who diverge from the proposed transaction selection strategy make more profit as compared to honest miners. Moreover, they have a detrimental effect on the processing throughput of the PHANTOM (and GHOSTDAG) due to same transactions being included in more than one block of different chains. Finally, we show that multiple miners not following the transaction selection strategy are incentivized to create a shared mining pool instead of mining independently, which has a negative impact on decentralization.
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