具有设计者不确定性的单峰域
Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
摘要：
本文研究了单峰域的设计者是不确定的基本对齐，根据该域是单峰。潜在的对齐是代理之间的共同知识，但偏好是私人知识。因此，世界的状态既有公共元素，也有私人元素，而设计者对两者都不知情。本文首先提出了一个相关的解的概念--混合信息均衡中的实施，它要求在公共信息下纳什策略的实施和在私人信息下的占优策略实施。然后，我确定必要和充分条件的社会规则是可实施的。该特征用于为设计者的各种信念结构识别一致和匿名的可实施社会规则，这基本上归结为从Moulin（1980）识别的大类中值规则中选择正确的规则，因此该结果可以被视为识别哪些中值规则对设计者的不确定性具有鲁棒性。
英文摘要：
This paper studies single-peaked domains where the designer is uncertain about the underlying alignment according to which the domain is single-peaked. The underlying alignment is common knowledge amongst agents, but preferences are private knowledge. Thus, the state of the world has both a public and private element, with the designer uninformed of both. I first posit a relevant solution concept called implementation in mixed information equilibria, which requires Nash implementation in the public information and dominant strategy implementation in the private information given the public information. I then identify necessary and sufficient conditions for social rules to be implementable. The characterization is used to identify unanimous and anonymous implementable social rules for various belief structures of the designer, which basically boils down to picking the right rules from the large class of median rules identified by Moulin (1980), and hence this result can be seen as identifying which median rules are robust to designer uncertainty.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
