稳定和极端不平等
Stable and extremely unequal
摘要:
我们强调了不可转让效用匹配中稳定性和平等性之间的紧张关系。我们考虑多对一的匹配,并将市场的双方称为学生和学校。后者的偏好是一致的,在这种情况下,这意味着学校的效用是学生效用的总和。我们发现,唯一的稳定分配显示匹配对之间的极端不平等。
英文摘要:
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。