波士顿机制与Gale-Shapley算法在择校问题中的应用
Sophisticated Students in Boston Mechanism and Gale-Shapley Algorithm for School Choice Problem
摘要：
我们提出了我们的实验结果模拟学校选择的问题，处理分配的学生到学校的基础上，每个组的完整的偏好列表，其他组使用两种算法：波士顿机制和学生提出Gale-Shapley算法。我们比较了复杂的学生改变他们的偏好列表与这两种算法的影响。我们的模拟结果表明，复杂的学生可以受益更多的波士顿机制相比，Gale-Shapley算法基于多个评价指标。
英文摘要：
We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice problem which deals with the assignment of students to schools based on each group's complete preference list for the other group using two algorithms: Boston mechanism and student-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. We compare the effects of sophisticated students altering their preference lists with regards to these two algorithms. Our simulation results show that sophisticated students can benefit more in Boston mechanism compared to Gale-Shapley algorithm based on multiple evaluation metrics.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
