一种针对预测能力有限的行人动力学的广义平均场博弈模型
A generalized mean-field game model for the dynamics of pedestrians with limited predictive abilities
AI总结:
本文提出带有限预测时长参数$θ$的广义行人动力学平均场博弈模型,统一了Hughes模型与标准MFG框架,给出中间$θ$取值下的正倒向求解系统,并通过数值测试探索问题适定性。
摘要:
本文研究了最初由Cristiani等人(DOI:10.1137/140962413)提出的行人流模型。该模型假设人群中的每个个体在已知区域内移动,目标是最小化给定的代价泛函。行人动力学特性与代价泛函本身都依赖于整个人群的位置。此外,假设行人具备预测能力,但这种能力在时间上有限,仅能延伸至未来$θ$个时间单位,其中$θ∈[0,∞)$是一个模型参数。1)当$θ=0$(无预测能力)时,我们还原了Hughes模型的建模假设,即人们仅基于人群的当前位置做出决策。2)而当$θ→∞$时,我们还原了标准平均场博弈(mean field game, MFG)框架,在该框架下人们能够预测其他个体在任意未来时刻的行为,并基于整个人群的当前和未来位置做出决策。3)对于$θ$的中间取值,我们得到了不同的结果:与Hughes模型类似,求解该问题的数值流程需要在每个固定时刻$t$运行一个离线流程,该流程通过求解对应的倒向时间Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程,返回时刻$t$的当前最优速度场;但与Hughes模型不同的是,此处的流程包含了对滑动时间窗口$[t,t+θ)$内人群行为的预测,因此最优速度场由一个正倒向系统的解给出,该系统如同MFG方法中一样,将Fokker-Planck方程与Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程结合起来。必须在每个时刻$t$求解不同正倒向系统这一事实,引发了新的有趣理论问题。数值测试将为该问题的适定性提供一些线索。
英文摘要:
This paper investigates the model for pedestrian flow firstly proposed in [Cristiani et al., DOI:10.1137/140962413]. The model assumes that each individual in the crowd moves in a known domain, aiming at minimizing a given cost functional. Both the pedestrian dynamics and the cost functional itself depend on the position of the whole crowd. In addition, pedestrians are assumed to have predictive abilities, but limited in time, extending only up to $θ$ time units into the future, where $θ\in[0,\infty)$ is a model parameter. 1) For $θ=0$ (no predictive abilities), we recover the modeling assumptions of the Hughes's model, where people take decisions on the basis of the current position of the crowd only. 2) For $θ\to\infty$, instead, we recover the standard mean field game (MFG) setting, where people are able to forecast the behavior of the others at any future time and take decisions on the basis of the current and future position of the whole crowd. 3) For intermediate values of $θ$ we obtain something different: as in the Hughes's model, the numerical procedure to solve the problem requires to run an off-line procedure at any fixed time $t$, which returns the current optimal velocity field at time $t$ by solving an associated backward-in-time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation; but, differently from the Hughes's model, here the procedure involves a prediction of the crowd behavior in the sliding time window $[t,t+θ)$, therefore the optimal velocity field is given by the solution to a forward-backward system which joins a Fokker-Planck equation with a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation as in the MFG approach. The fact that a different forward-backward system must be solved at any time $t$ arises new interesting theoretical questions. Numerical tests will give some clues about the well-posedness of the problem.
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