激励对医疗器械的依从性
Incentivizing Compliance with Algorithmic Instruments
摘要:
由于参与者的潜在不依从性,随机实验可能容易受到选择偏倚的影响。虽然大部分现有的工作已经研究了遵守作为一个静态的行为,我们提出了一个博弈论模型来研究遵守的动态行为,可能会随着时间的推移而改变。在回合中,社交计划者与一系列异质代理交互,这些代理以其未观察到的私有类型到达,该私有类型确定他们在动作中的先前偏好(例如,对照组和治疗组)和他们的基线奖励而不进行任何治疗。规划者为每个代理提供一个随机的建议,可以改变他们的信念和行动选择。我们开发了一种新的推荐机制,认为规划师的建议作为一种形式的工具变量(IV),只影响代理的行动选择,但不观察到的奖励。我们通过仔细映射历史-规划者和先前代理之间的交互-到随机推荐来构建这样的IV。尽管最初的代理人可能完全不合规,但我们的机制可以随着时间的推移激励合规性,从而能够估计每次治疗的治疗效果,并最大限度地减少目标是确定最佳治疗的计划者的累积遗憾。
英文摘要:
Randomized experiments can be susceptible to selection bias due to potential non-compliance by the participants. While much of the existing work has studied compliance as a static behavior, we propose a game-theoretic model to study compliance as dynamic behavior that may change over time. In rounds, a social planner interacts with a sequence of heterogeneous agents who arrive with their unobserved private type that determines both their prior preferences across the actions (e.g., control and treatment) and their baseline rewards without taking any treatment. The planner provides each agent with a randomized recommendation that may alter their beliefs and their action selection. We develop a novel recommendation mechanism that views the planner's recommendation as a form of instrumental variable (IV) that only affects an agents' action selection, but not the observed rewards. We construct such IVs by carefully mapping the history -- the interactions between the planner and the previous agents -- to a random recommendation. Even though the initial agents may be completely non-compliant, our mechanism can incentivize compliance over time, thereby enabling the estimation of the treatment effect of each treatment, and minimizing the cumulative regret of the planner whose goal is to identify the optimal treatment.
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