用于核法证浓缩重建的PTFE中极低辐射剂量的测量
Measuring Very Low Radiation Doses in PTFE for Nuclear Forensic Enrichment Reconstruction
摘要：
每个制造核武器的国家都使用过铀浓缩。尽管这一技术对国际安全至关重要，但仍然没有过去浓缩的可靠实物标记，可用于对历史上生产的武器进行法医核查。我们表明，浓缩过程中铀α排放的极低放射性在常见的浓缩垫圈材料PTFE中留下了可检测和不可逆的量热特征，从而可以以比一件武器的高浓缩铀数量更高的灵敏度重建过去浓缩活动的历史。快速扫描量热法还可以测量连续切片的重结晶度，确认辐射照射的大小和类型，同时还可以检测篡改情况，并提供一种用于分析条约核查的现场样本的方法。这项工作为普通物品变成精确的剂量计打开了大门，可以高度可靠地检测过去是否存在放射性、核材料和相关活动。
英文摘要：
Every country that has made nuclear weapons has used uranium enrichment. Despite the centrality of this technology to international security, there is still no reliable physical marker of past enrichment that can be used to perform forensic verification of historically produced weapons. We show that the extremely low radioactivity from uranium alpha emissions during enrichment leaves detectable and irreversible calorimetric signatures in the common enrichment gasket material PTFE, allowing for historical reconstruction of past enrichment activities at a sensitivity better than one weapon's quantity of highly enriched uranium. Fast scanning calorimetry also enables the measurement of recrystallization enthalpies of sequentially microtomed slices, confirming the magnitude and the type of radiation exposure while also providing a detection of tampering and a method for analyzing field samples useful for treaty verification. This work opens the door for common items to be turned into precise dosimeters to detect the past presence of radioactivity, nuclear materials, and related activities with high confidence.
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