Calvert-Wittman模型中的单调比较静态分析
Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model
摘要：
在本文中，我们表明，当政策驱动的政党可以致力于一个特定的平台，在一维的选举竞争中的效价问题不会出现有一定的正相关的候选人的政策和政策之间的期望，在最低和最高的均衡的选举竞争。我们还表明，如果各方不能承诺一个特定的政策，这不必如此。这意味着，已颁布的政策与首选政策之间存在负相关关系的证据表明，一些政党持有他们想要改变的立场，但却无法这样做。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
