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arXiv 2107.01856cs.AIcs.LGcs.MA
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不惜一切代价的胜利--用强化学习打破卡特尔禁令

Winning at Any Cost -- Infringing the Cartel Prohibition With Reinforcement Learning

University of Mannheim(曼海姆大学)

Michael Schlechtinger, Damaris Kosack, Heiko Paulheim, Thomas Fetzer

摘要:

定价决策越来越多地由AI做出。由于它们能够在动态决策的同时使用实时市场数据进行训练,深度强化学习算法在做出此类定价决策时特别有效。在电子商务场景中,多个强化学习代理可以根据竞争对手的价格设定价格。因此,研究表明,从长远来看,代理人可能最终处于共谋状态。为了进一步分析这个问题,我们建立了一个场景,是基于一个囚犯的困境,其中三个代理人玩石头剪刀布游戏的修改版本。我们的研究结果表明,行动选择可以被分解成特定的阶段,建立可能性,以开发能够识别的情况下,可能导致竞争对手之间的勾结预防系统。我们还提供了证据的情况下,代理人能够执行一个默契的合作策略,而没有明确的训练这样做。

英文摘要:

Pricing decisions are increasingly made by AI. Thanks to their ability to train with live market data while making decisions on the fly, deep reinforcement learning algorithms are especially effective in taking such pricing decisions. In e-commerce scenarios, multiple reinforcement learning agents can set prices based on their competitor's prices. Therefore, research states that agents might end up in a state of collusion in the long run. To further analyze this issue, we build a scenario that is based on a modified version of a prisoner's dilemma where three agents play the game of rock paper scissors. Our results indicate that the action selection can be dissected into specific stages, establishing the possibility to develop collusion prevention systems that are able to recognize situations which might lead to a collusion between competitors. We furthermore provide evidence for a situation where agents are capable of performing a tacit cooperation strategy without being explicitly trained to do so.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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