Uniswap is a decentralized exchange (DEX) and was first launched on November 2, 2018 on the Ethereum mainnet [1] and is part of an Ecosystem of products in Decentralized Finance (DeFi). It replaces a traditional order book type of trading common on centralized exchanges (CEX) with a deterministic model that swaps currencies (or tokens/assets) along a fixed price function determined by the amount of currencies supplied by the liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can be regarded as investors in the decentralized exchange and earn fixed commissions per trade. They lock up funds in liquidity pools for distinct pairs of currencies allowing market participants to swap them using the fixed price function. Liquidity providers take on market risk as a liquidity provider in exchange for earning commissions on each trade. Here we analyze the risk profile of a liquidity provider and the so called impermanent (unrealized) loss in particular. We provide an improved version of the commonly denoted impermanent loss function for Uniswap v2 on the semi-infinite domain. The differences between Uniswap v2 and v3 are also discussed.
AMMs are autonomous smart contracts deployed on a blockchain that make markets between different assets that live on that chain. In this paper we are examining a specific class of AMMs called Constant Function Market Makers whose trading profile, ignoring fees, is determined by their bonding curve. This class of AMM suffers from what is commonly referred to as Impermanent Loss, which we have previously identified as the Gamma component of the associated self-financing trading strategy and which is the risk that LP providers wager against potential fee earnings. The recent Uniswap v3 release ha…
Liquidity providers are essential for the function of decentralized exchanges to ensure liquidity takers can be guaranteed a counterparty for their trades. However, liquidity providers investing in liquidity pools face many risks, the most prominent of which is impermanent loss. Currently, analysis of this metric is difficult to conduct due to different market maker algorithms, fee structures and concentrated liquidity dynamics across the various exchanges. To this end, we provide a framework to generalize impermanent loss for multiple asset pools obeying any constant function market maker wit…
Uniswap is a Constant Product Market Maker built around liquidity pools, where pairs of tokens are exchanged subject to a fee that is proportional to the size of transactions. At the time of writing, there exist more than 6,000 pools associated with Uniswap v3, implying that empirical investigations on the full ecosystem can easily become computationally expensive. Thus, we propose a systematic workflow to extract and analyse a meaningful but computationally tractable sub-universe of liquidity pools. Leveraging on the 34 pools found relevant for the six-months time window January-June 2022, we…
Automated market makers (AMM) have grown to obtain significant market share within the cryptocurrency ecosystem, resulting in a proliferation of new products pursuing exotic strategies for horizontal differentiation. Yet, their theoretical properties are curiously homogeneous when a set of basic assumptions are met. In this paper, we start by presenting a universal approach to deriving a formula for liquidity provisioning for AMMs. Next, we show that the constant function market maker and token swap market maker models are theoretically equivalent when liquidity reserves are uniform. Proceedin…
We study recurrent patterns in volatility and volume for major cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ether, using data from two centralized exchanges (Coinbase Pro and Binance) and a decentralized exchange (Uniswap V2). We find systematic patterns in both volatility and volume across day-of-the-week, hour-of-the-day, and within the hour. These patterns have grown stronger over the years and can be related to algorithmic trading and funding times in futures markets. We also document that price formation mainly takes place on the centralized exchanges while price adjustments on the decentralized exchang…
Growth rate of liquidity provider's wealth in G3Ms
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen)（香港中文大学（深圳））；National Tsing Hua University（国立清华大学）；Baruch College, The City University of New York（纽约市立大学巴鲁克学院）
Geometric mean market makers (G3Ms), such as Uniswap and Balancer, comprise a popular class of automated market makers (AMMs) defined by the following rule: the reserves of the AMM before and after each trade must have the same (weighted) geometric mean. This paper extends several results known for constant-weight G3Ms to the general case of G3Ms with time-varying and potentially stochastic weights. These results include the returns and no-arbitrage prices of liquidity pool (LP) shares that investors receive for supplying liquidity to G3Ms. Using these expressions, we show how to create G3Ms w…
The study proposes a quote-driven predictive automated market maker (AMM) platform with on-chain custody and settlement functions, alongside off-chain predictive reinforcement learning capabilities to improve liquidity provision of real-world AMMs. The proposed AMM architecture is an augmentation to the Uniswap V3, a cryptocurrency AMM protocol, by utilizing a novel market equilibrium pricing for reduced divergence and slippage loss. Further, the proposed architecture involves a predictive AMM capability, utilizing a deep hybrid Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Q-learning reinforcement learni…
Liquidity and trading activity on constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap, Curve, and Balancer has grown significantly in the second half of 2020. Much of the growth of these protocols has been driven by incentivized pools or 'yield farming', which reward participants in crypto assets for providing liquidity to CFMMs. As a result, CFMMs and associated protocols, which were historically very small markets, now constitute the most liquid trading venues for a large number of crypto assets. But what does it mean for a CFMM to be the most liquid market? In this paper, we propose a b…
Liquidity provision in CLMMs: evidence from transactions data
Vega Institute Foundation（维加研究所基金会）；Chuvash State University（楚瓦什国立大学）；Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology（莫斯科物理技术学院）；Satbayev Kazakh National Technical University（萨塔耶夫哈萨克国立技术大学）
Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap have facilitated trillions of dollars of digital asset trades and have billions of dollars of liquidity. One natural question is how to optimally route trades across a network of CFMMs in order to ensure the largest possible utility (as specified by a user). We present an efficient algorithm, based on a decomposition method, to solve the problem of optimally executing an order across a network of decentralized exchanges. The decomposition method, as a side effect, makes it simple to incorporate more complicated CFMMs, or even include 'agg…
One of the exciting recent developments in decentralized finance (DeFi) has been the development of decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges that can autonomously handle conversion between different cryptocurrencies. Decentralized exchange protocols such as Uniswap, Curve and other types of Automated Market Makers (AMMs) maintain a liquidity pool (LP) of two or more assets constrained to maintain at all times a mathematical relation to each other, defined by a given function or curve. Examples of such functions are the constant-sum and constant-product AMMs. Existing systems however suffer from …
