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arXiv 2106.13054cs.DMcs.AI
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具有二维欧氏偏好的加权多数竞赛图和Kemeny排序

Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences

Sorbonne Université(索邦大学);CNRS(法国国家科学研究中心);Institut Universitaire de France (IUF)(法国大学研究院)

Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová

摘要:

假设选民的偏好具有某种共同的结构,这是规避社会选择问题中NP困难结果的标准方法。虽然Kemeny排序问题在一般情况下是NP难的,但如果偏好是一维欧几里得的,则已知它变得容易。在本说明中,我们通过证明任何加权锦标赛(分别为$\ell_1$、$\ell_2$和$\ell_\infty$),证明了Kemeny排名问题对于$k$维欧几里得偏好和$k\!\ge\!2$来说仍然是NP困难的。加权二分竞赛)具有相同奇偶性的权重(分别为偶数权重)可归纳为在范数$\ell_2$下的2-欧几里德偏好的简档的加权多数锦标赛(resp. $\ell_1,\ell_{\infty}$),可在多项式时间内计算。更一般地,关于加权锦标赛的该结果本质上意味着,硬度结果依赖于在一般情况下成立的(加权)多数锦标赛(例如,NP-硬度的斯莱特排名)仍然是真实的二维欧几里德偏好。

英文摘要:

The assumption that voters' preferences share some common structure is a standard way to circumvent NP-hardness results in social choice problems. While the Kemeny ranking problem is NP-hard in the general case, it is known to become easy if the preferences are 1-dimensional Euclidean. In this note, we prove that the Kemeny ranking problem remains NP-hard for $k$-dimensional Euclidean preferences with $k\!\ge\!2$ under norms $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$ and $\ell_\infty$, by showing that any weighted tournament (resp. weighted bipartite tournament) with weights of same parity (resp. even weights) is inducible as the weighted majority tournament of a profile of 2-Euclidean preferences under norm $\ell_2$ (resp. $\ell_1,\ell_{\infty}$), computable in polynomial time. More generally, this result regarding weighted tournaments implies, essentially, that hardness results relying on the (weighted) majority tournament that hold in the general case (e.g., NP-hardness of Slater ranking) are still true for 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences.

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