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arXiv 2106.05407cs.CRcs.NI
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OVRseen:Oculus VR中的网络流量和隐私策略审计

OVRseen: Auditing Network Traffic and Privacy Policies in Oculus VR

Rahmadi Trimananda, Hieu Le, Hao Cui, Janice Tran Ho, Anastasia Shuba, Athina Markopoulou

摘要:

虚拟现实(VR)是一种新兴技术,它可以实现新的应用,但也会带来隐私风险。在本文中,我们重点介绍了VR领域的领先平台Oculus VR(OVR),并从网络和隐私政策的角度,首次全面分析了OVR应用程序和平台本身暴露的个人数据。我们试用了Quest 2头显,并测试了Oculus官方和SideQuest应用商店中最受欢迎的VR应用程序。我们开发了OVRseen,一种用于收集、分析和比较OVR上的网络流量和隐私策略的方法和系统。在网络方面,我们捕获并解密了VR应用程序的网络流量,这在OVR上是不可能的,我们提取了数据流,定义为<app,数据类型,目的地>。与移动和其他应用生态系统相比,我们发现OVR更加集中,并且由跟踪和分析驱动,而不是由第三方广告驱动。我们展示了VR应用程序暴露的数据类型包括个人身份信息(PII)、可用于指纹识别的设备信息以及VR特定的数据类型。通过将网络流量中发现的数据流与应用程序隐私政策中的声明进行比较,我们发现大约70%的OVR数据流没有正确披露。此外,我们从隐私政策中提取了额外的上下文,我们观察到69%的数据流用于与应用程序核心功能无关的目的。

英文摘要:

Virtual reality (VR) is an emerging technology that enables new applications but also introduces privacy risks. In this paper, we focus on Oculus VR (OVR), the leading platform in the VR space and we provide the first comprehensive analysis of personal data exposed by OVR apps and the platform itself, from a combined networking and privacy policy perspective. We experimented with the Quest 2 headset and tested the most popular VR apps available on the official Oculus and the SideQuest app stores. We developed OVRseen, a methodology and system for collecting, analyzing, and comparing network traffic and privacy policies on OVR. On the networking side, we captured and decrypted network traffic of VR apps, which was previously not possible on OVR, and we extracted data flows, defined as <app, data type, destination>. Compared to the mobile and other app ecosystems, we found OVR to be more centralized and driven by tracking and analytics, rather than by third-party advertising. We show that the data types exposed by VR apps include personally identifiable information (PII), device information that can be used for fingerprinting, and VR-specific data types. By comparing the data flows found in the network traffic with statements made in the apps' privacy policies, we found that approximately 70% of OVR data flows were not properly disclosed. Furthermore, we extracted additional context from the privacy policies, and we observed that 69% of the data flows were used for purposes unrelated to the core functionality of apps.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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