Phoenix:经过正式认证的再生保险库
Phoenix: A Formally Verified Regenerating Vault
摘要:
获得加密货币用户私钥访问权限的攻击者可以代替她执行任何操作。由于大多数加密货币的分散性,没有实体可以恢复这些操作。这是去中心化系统面临的一个核心挑战,许多引人注目的抢劫案就说明了这一点。保险库合同通过引入人为的操作延迟来降低这种风险,允许合同所有者在延迟期间流产。然而,钥匙被盗仍然使金库无法使用,并使资金处于危险之中。我们介绍凤凰,一种新颖的合同体系结构,允许用户恢复其安全属性后,密钥丢失。Phoenix利用用户将密钥存储在容易获得但不太安全的存储(第二层)以及更安全但更难访问的存储(第一层)中的能力。与以前的解决方案不同,用户可以在第二层密钥被盗后恢复Phoenix安全性,并且即使在任何一层中丢失密钥也不会丢失资金。Phoenix还引入了一种机制,以减少攻击者在第一层妥协的情况下可能造成的损害。我们正式指定了Phoenix所需的行为,并提供了Phoenix作为以太坊合约的原型实现。由于这样的实现是高度敏感的,容易受到微妙的错误,我们应用形式化验证工具来证明特定的代码属性和识别故障。我们强调了该工具识别的一个错误,该错误可能被攻击者利用来危害Phoenix。在修复缺陷后,该工具证明了底层可执行代码的正确性。
英文摘要:
An attacker that gains access to a cryptocurrency user's private keys can perform any operation in her stead. Due to the decentralized nature of most cryptocurrencies, no entity can revert those operations. This is a central challenge for decentralized systems, illustrated by numerous high-profile heists. Vault contracts reduce this risk by introducing artificial delay on operations, allowing abortion by the contract owner during the delay. However, the theft of a key still renders the vault unusable and puts funds at risk. We introduce Phoenix, a novel contract architecture that allows the user to restore its security properties after key loss. Phoenix takes advantage of users' ability to store keys in easily-available but less secure storage (tier-two) as well as more secure storage that is harder to access (tier-one). Unlike previous solutions, the user can restore Phoenix security after the theft of tier-two keys and does not lose funds despite losing keys in either tier. Phoenix also introduces a mechanism to reduce the damage an attacker can cause in case of a tier-one compromise. We formally specify Phoenix's required behavior and provide a prototype implementation of Phoenix as an Ethereum contract. Since such an implementation is highly sensitive and vulnerable to subtle bugs, we apply a formal verification tool to prove specific code properties and identify faults. We highlight a bug identified by the tool that could be exploited by an attacker to compromise Phoenix. After fixing the bug, the tool proved the low-level executable code's correctness.
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