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arXiv 2106.00965cs.SE
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ALFRED:一种使分层体系结构的组件故障树成为可能的方法

ALFRED: a methodology to enable component fault trees for layered architectures

Kai Hoefig, Marc Zeller, Reiner Heilmann

摘要:

在安全关键系统的早期开发阶段,识别安全方面的缺点或不安全性也很重要。在工业中,开发工件(如组件或单元)通常从现有工件中重用,以节省时间和成本。当开发工件被重用时,它们现有的安全分析模型是新系统早期安全评估的重要输入,因为它们已经提供了有效的模型。组件故障树支持这样的重用策略的组合水平的方法。但目前的发展战略不仅横向划分系统,通过将不同的功能封装到单独的组件和组件的层次结构中,而且垂直地封装到软件和硬件架构层中。目前的安全分析方法,如组件故障树,不支持这样的垂直层。因此,我们在这里提出了一种方法,能够划分成不同层次的系统架构的安全分析模型。我们使用所谓的架构层故障诊断来启用架构的不同层上的组件故障树。然后,这些依赖关系用于为整个系统和所有不同的架构层生成安全证据。一个案例研究适用于硬件和软件层的方法。

英文摘要:

Identifying drawbacks or insufficiencies in terms of safety is important also in early development stages of safety critical systems. In industry, development artefacts such as components or units, are often reused from existing artefacts to save time and costs. When development artefacts are reused, their existing safety analysis models are an important input for an early safety assessment for the new system, since they already provide a valid model. Component fault trees support such reuse strategies by a compositional horizontal approach. But current development strategies do not only divide systems horizontally, e.g., By encapsulating different functionality into separate components and hierarchies of components, but also vertically, e.g. Into software and hardware architecture layers. Current safety analysis methodologies, such as component fault trees, do not support such vertical layers. Therefore, we present here a methodology that is able to divide safety analysis models into different layers of a systems architecture. We use so called Architecture Layer Failure Dependencies to enable component fault trees on different layers of an architecture. These dependencies are then used to generate safety evidence for the entire system and over all different architecture layers. A case study applies the approach to hardware and software layers.

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