基于序列幅度和符号随机性的信息物理系统隐藏攻击检测
Detection of Hidden Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems from Serial Magnitude and Sign Randomness Inconsistencies
摘要:
对网络物理系统(CPS)的隐形虚假数据注入攻击会向机载传感器引入错误的测量信息,从而降低系统性能。智能攻击者能够利用系统模型和噪声特性的知识来改变传感器测量,同时保持未被检测到。为了实现这一目标,设计了隐身攻击序列,使得检测器在受攻击和无攻击的情况下表现相似。因此,想要保持隐藏的攻击者将留下不一致行为的痕迹,与系统模型相矛盾。为了解决这个问题,我们提出了一个运行时监视器,通过监视检测测试措施的串行不一致性来发现传感器测量中的这些不一致。具体来说,我们采用卡方故障检测程序来监测其卡方测试措施的幅度和符号序列。我们验证了我们的方法与模拟的无人地面车辆(UGV)的隐身攻击下,并比较各种国家的最先进的异常检测器的检测性能。
英文摘要:
Stealthy false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs) introduce erroneous measurement information to on-board sensors with the purpose to degrade system performance. An intelligent attacker is able to leverage knowledge of the system model and noise characteristics to alter sensor measurements while remaining undetected. To achieve this objective, the stealthy attack sequence is designed such that the detector performs similarly in the attacked and attack-free cases. Consequently, an attacker that wants to remain hidden will leave behind traces of inconsistent behavior, contradicting the system model. To deal with this problem, we propose a runtime monitor to find these inconsistencies in sensor measurements by monitoring for serial inconsistencies of the detection test measure. Specifically, we employ the chi-square fault detection procedure to monitor the magnitude and signed sequence of its chi-square test measure. We validate our approach with simulations on an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) under stealthy attacks and compare the detection performance with various state-of-the-art anomaly detectors.
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