WELES:策略驱动的虚拟机的可扩展性完整性实施
WELES: Policy-driven Runtime Integrity Enforcement of Virtual Machines
摘要:
信任是租户在云中部署其安全敏感服务的首要考虑因素。即使存在对云具有管理访问权限的强大对手,也需要确保部署这些服务的虚拟机的完整性。用于解决该挑战的传统方法利用可信计算技术,例如,vTPM或硬件CPU扩展,例如,AMD SEV。但是,它们容易受到强大对手的攻击,或者它们只提供VM的加载时间(而不是运行时)完整性测量。我们提出WELES,一个协议,允许租户建立和维护信任的VM运行时的完整性的软件及其配置。WELES对于VM配置和设置是透明的。它在安全登录期间执行VM的隐式证明,并将VM完整性状态与安全连接绑定。我们的原型的评估表明,WELES是实用的,引起低的性能开销。
英文摘要:
Trust is of paramount concern for tenants to deploy their security-sensitive services in the cloud. The integrity of VMs in which these services are deployed needs to be ensured even in the presence of powerful adversaries with administrative access to the cloud. Traditional approaches for solving this challenge leverage trusted computing techniques, e.g., vTPM, or hardware CPU extensions, e.g., AMD SEV. But, they are vulnerable to powerful adversaries, or they provide only load time (not runtime) integrity measurements of VMs. We propose WELES, a protocol allowing tenants to establish and maintain trust in VM runtime integrity of software and its configuration. WELES is transparent to the VM configuration and setup. It performs an implicit attestation of VMs during a secure login and binds the VM integrity state with the secure connection. Our prototype's evaluation shows that WELES is practical and incurs low performance overhead.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。