arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2104.11469cs.CRcs.AR
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ClepsydraCache --使用基于时间的逐出防止缓存攻击

ClepsydraCache -- Preventing Cache Attacks with Time-Based Evictions

Jan Philipp Thoma, Christian Niesler, Dominic Funke, Gregor Leander, Pierre Mayr, Nils Pohl, Lucas Davi, Tim Güneysu

摘要:

在最近的过去,我们已经目睹了向微架构CPU级别的攻击的转变。特别是,高速缓存侧通道发挥着主导作用,因为它们允许攻击者通过利用CPU微架构来泄露秘密信息。这些微妙的攻击利用了冲突缓存地址的体系结构可见性。在本文中,我们提出了ClepsydraCache,它减轻了最先进的缓存攻击,使用缓存衰减和索引随机化的新组合。每个缓存条目都与生存时间(TTL)值相关联。我们提出了一个新的动态调度机制的TTL,在防止这些攻击,同时保持性能发挥了根本性的作用。ClepsydraCache有效地抵御最新的缓存攻击,如Prime+(Prune+)Probe。我们提出了一个完整的原型在gem 5和布局的TTL机制,这表明在现实世界的系统中部署ClepsydraCache的可行性的概念验证硬件设计。

英文摘要:

In the recent past, we have witnessed the shift towards attacks on the microarchitectural CPU level. In particular, cache side-channels play a predominant role as they allow an attacker to exfiltrate secret information by exploiting the CPU microarchitecture. These subtle attacks exploit the architectural visibility of conflicting cache addresses. In this paper, we present ClepsydraCache, which mitigates state-of-the-art cache attacks using a novel combination of cache decay and index randomization. Each cache entry is linked with a Time-To-Live (TTL) value. We propose a new dynamic scheduling mechanism of the TTL which plays a fundamental role in preventing those attacks while maintaining performance. ClepsydraCache efficiently protects against the latest cache attacks such as Prime+(Prune+)Probe. We present a full prototype in gem5 and lay out a proof-of-concept hardware design of the TTL mechanism, which demonstrates the feasibility of deploying ClepsydraCache in real-world systems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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