Markov 实现与先验实现下 n 人图对策的 Nash 可解性
On Nash-solvability of n-person graphical games under Markov's and a priori realizations
AI总结:
针对无纯平稳 Nash 均衡的完美信息图式 n 人对策,本文比较 Markov 实现与先验实现下混合策略均衡的存在性及性质,并用 2、3 人例子加以说明。
摘要:
我们考虑具有完美信息但在纯平稳策略中不存在 Nash 均衡的图式 n 人对策。为在混合策略中求解这些对策,我们在所有非终止位置引入概率分布。相应的博弈过程可以在两种不同的基本假设下分析:Markov 实现与先验实现。前者保证每个局中人在每种情形下都存在一致最优响应;然而,即使在混合策略中,Nash 均衡也可能不存在。经典 Nash 定理并不适用,因为 Markov 实现可能产生不连续的极限分布和有效支付函数。先验实现不具备 Markov 实现的许多优良性质(例如一致最优响应的存在性),但作为回报,Nash 定理可以适用。我们通过分别有 2 名和 3 名局中人的两个例子详细说明这两种实现,并给出一些一般性结果。
英文摘要:
We consider graphical $n$-person games with perfect information that have no Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Solving these games in mixed strategies, we introduce probabilistic distributions in all non-terminal positions. The corresponding plays can be analyzed under two different basic assumptions: Markov's and a priori realizations. The former one guarantees existence of a uniformly best response of each player in every situation. Nevertheless, Nash equilibrium may fail to exist even in mixed strategies. The classical Nash theorem is not applicable, since Markov's realizations may result in the limit distributions and effective payoff functions that are not continuous. The a priori realization does not share many nice properties of the Markov one (for example, existence of the uniformly best response) but in return, Nash's theorem is applicable. We illustrate both realizations in details by two examples with $2$ and $3$ players and also provide some general results.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。