arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2104.07049econ.GNq-fin.EC
收藏

有限合伙协议的优化设计

Optimal Design of Limited Partnership Agreements

Mohammad Abbas Rezaei

摘要:

一般合伙人(GP)有时按每笔交易支付报酬,有时按整个投资组合支付报酬。什么时候一种支付方式比另一种更好?我表明,当资产(项目或公司)是高度相关的,或当GP有低的声誉,整个投资组合的合同优于交易的合同。在这种情况下,通过将支出捆绑在一起,整体投资组合合同增强了全科医生努力工作的激励。因此,它更适合于缓解在资产相关性高或GP声誉低的情况下比逆向选择问题更强的道德风险问题。相比之下,对于资产的低相关性或GP的高声誉,信息不对称问题占主导地位,逐笔交易合同成为最优合同,因为它们可以有效地逐个淘汰坏项目。这些结果揭示了投资者和风险资本家之间的关系,最近的实证研究结果。

英文摘要:

General partners (GP) are sometimes paid on a deal-by-deal basis and other times on a whole-portfolio basis. When is one method of payment better than the other? I show that when assets (projects or firms) are highly correlated or when GPs have low reputation, whole-portfolio contracting is superior to deal-by-deal contracting. In this case, by bundling payouts together, whole-portfolio contracting enhances incentives for GPs to exert effort. Therefore, it is better suited to alleviate the moral hazard problem which is stronger than the adverse selection problem in the case of high correlation of assets or low reputation of GPs. In contrast, for low correlation of assets or high reputation of GPs, information asymmetry concerns dominate and deal-by-deal contracts become optimal, as they can efficiently weed out bad projects one by one. These results shed light on recent empirical findings on the relationship between investors and venture capitalists.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑