一致性和合理性，而不是在场？XR经验与效应的初始条件--一个新的模型
Congruence and Plausibility, not Presence?! Pivotal Conditions for XR Experiences and Effects, a Novel Model
摘要：
存在通常被认为是描述在计算机生成和/或计算机介导的虚拟环境中的主观感觉的最重要的质量。正交存在分量的识别和分离，即，地点错觉和可感知性错觉，是一种被广泛接受的描述虚拟现实体验的理论模型。这篇观点文章挑战了这种以存在为导向的VR理论。首先，我们认为地方错觉不能成为描述虚拟、增强和混合现实（VR、AR、MR或简称XR）更广泛范围的主要结构。第二，我们认为，没有可解释性错觉，而仅仅是可解释性，我们得出的地方错觉所造成的一致和似是而非的空间线索的产生，并同样为所有当前模型的所谓定义的错觉。最后，我们提出了一致性和可解释性成为描述XR经验和效应的新理论模型的核心必要条件。
英文摘要：
Presence often is considered the most important quale describing the subjective feeling of being in a computer-generated and/or computer-mediated virtual environment. The identification and separation of orthogonal presence components, i.e., the place illusion and the plausibility illusion, has been an accepted theoretical model describing Virtual Reality (VR) experiences for some time. This perspective article challenges this presence-oriented VR theory. First, we argue that a place illusion cannot be the major construct to describe the much wider scope of Virtual, Augmented, and Mixed Reality (VR, AR, MR: or XR for short). Second, we argue that there is no plausibility illusion but merely plausibility, and we derive the place illusion caused by congruent and plausible generation of spatial cues, and similarly for all the current model's so-defined illusions. Finally, we propose congruence and plausibility to become the central essential conditions in a novel theoretical model describing XR experiences and effects.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
