SPoTKD：一种使用自供电计时设备的公共信道对称密钥分配协议
SPoTKD: A Protocol for Symmetric Key Distribution over Public Channels Using Self-Powered Timekeeping Devices
摘要：
在本文中，我们提出了一类新的对称密钥分发协议，利用低成本，硬件芯片组包含数百万个同步自供电定时器提供的基本安全原语。密钥是从物理的、微尺度的时间保持设备的时间动态中导出的，该时间保持设备使得密钥对任何潜在的侧信道攻击、恶意篡改或窥探免疫。使用自供电定时器的行为模型，我们首先表明，派生的密钥串可以通过由美国国家标准与技术研究院（NIST）套件定义的随机性测试。然后，密钥串被用于两个SPoTKD（自供电定时器密钥分发）协议中，该协议利用定时器的动态特性作为单向函数：（a）协议1促进用户和远程服务器之间的安全通信，以及（b）协议2促进两个用户之间的安全通信。在本文中，我们研究了这些协议在标准模型下以及在不同的对抗攻击下的安全性。使用蒙特卡罗模拟，我们还调查了这些协议在现实世界的操作条件下的鲁棒性，并提出了纠错SPoTKD协议，以减轻这些噪声相关的文物。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we propose a novel class of symmetric key distribution protocols that leverages basic security primitives offered by low-cost, hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers. The keys are derived from the temporal dynamics of a physical, micro-scale time-keeping device which makes the keys immune to any potential side-channel attacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. Using the behavioral model of the self-powered timers, we first show that the derived key-strings can pass the randomness test as defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) suite. The key-strings are then used in two SPoTKD (Self-Powered Timer Key Distribution) protocols that exploit the timer's dynamics as one-way functions: (a) protocol 1 facilitates secure communications between a user and a remote Server, and (b) protocol 2 facilitates secure communications between two users. In this paper, we investigate the security of these protocols under standard model and against different adversarial attacks. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we also investigate the robustness of these protocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and propose error-correcting SPoTKD protocols to mitigate these noise-related artifacts.
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