共享用餐：使用用餐密码学家组广播秘密共享
Shared-Dining: Broadcasting Secret Shares using Dining-Cryptographers Groups
摘要：
一个k-匿名广播可以使用一小群用餐的密码学家来实现，首先共享消息，然后由组成员开始泛洪阶段。成员没有动力及时转发信息，因为转发会产生成本，或者他们甚至可以从保留信息中获利。在最坏的情况下，这使得真正的发起者成为唯一的发送者，从而使用餐密码学家阶段无用并损害他们的隐私。提出了一种新的方法，使用一个修改的用餐密码协议的（n，k）-Shamir的秘密共享计划的分配份额。最后，所有组成员通过网络广播他们收到的共享，允许任何k个共享的接收者重建消息，强制匿名。如果少于k个组成员广播他们的共享，则消息不能被解码，从而防止发起者的隐私泄露。我们的系统提供了（n- |attackers|）-匿名高达k-1攻击者和传播的性能影响不大。我们显示这些结果的安全分析和性能评估的基础上的概念验证原型。10到100 kB/s之间的吞吐率对于许多具有高隐私要求的实际应用是足够的，例如，金融区块链系统。
英文摘要：
A k-anonymous broadcast can be implemented using a small group of dining cryptographers to first share the message, followed by a flooding phase started by group members. Members have little incentive to forward the message in a timely manner, as forwarding incurs costs, or they may even profit from keeping the message. In worst case, this leaves the true originator as the only sender, rendering the dining-cryptographers phase useless and compromising their privacy. We present a novel approach using a modified dining-cryptographers protocol to distributed shares of an (n,k)-Shamir's secret sharing scheme. Finally, all group members broadcast their received share through the network, allowing any recipient of k shares to reconstruct the message, enforcing anonymity. If less than k group members broadcast their shares, the message cannot be decoded thus preventing privacy breaches for the originator. Our system provides (n-|attackers|)-anonymity for up to k-1 attackers and has little performance impact on dissemination. We show these results in a security analysis and performance evaluation based on a proof-of-concept prototype. Throughput rates between 10 and 100 kB/s are enough for many real applications with high privacy requirements, e.g., financial blockchain system.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
