RFQuack:一个用于无线协议(安全)分析与研究的通用软硬件工具包
RFQuack: A Universal Hardware-Software Toolkit for Wireless Protocol (Security) Analysis and Research
摘要:
软件定义无线电(SDR)对于信号侦察和物理层分解是必不可少的,但是尽管我们有像Universal Radio Hacker这样的先进工具,基于SDR的方法仍然需要大量的努力。此外,RF加密狗(如流行的Yard Stick One)易于使用,并保证确定性的物理层实现。然而,它们不是很灵活,因为每个加密狗都是一个静态硬件系统,具有单片固件。我们提出RFquack,一个开源的工具和库固件,结合了基于软件的方法的灵活性与嵌入式RF前端的确定性和性能。RFquack是基于一个多无线电硬件系统,具有可交换的RF前端,以及一个固件,公开了一个统一的,硬件无关的API。RFquack专注于结构化固件架构,允许与RF前端进行高级别和低级别的交互。它有助于主机端脚本和固件插件的开发,以实现高效的数据处理管道或交互式协议,这要归功于多无线电支持。RFquack有一个IPython外壳和9个固件模块,用于:频谱扫描,自动载波检测和比特率估计,远程管理的无头操作,飞行中的数据包过滤和操作,MouseJack和RollJam(作为示例)。我们使用RFquack来设置RF黑客竞赛,分析工业级设备和密钥卡,我们发现并报告了其RF协议中的11个漏洞。
英文摘要:
Software-defined radios (SDRs) are indispensable for signal reconnaissance and physical-layer dissection, but despite we have advanced tools like Universal Radio Hacker, SDR-based approaches require substantial effort. Contrarily, RF dongles such as the popular Yard Stick One are easy to use and guarantee a deterministic physical-layer implementation. However, they're not very flexible, as each dongle is a static hardware system with a monolithic firmware. We present RFquack, an open-source tool and library firmware that combines the flexibility of a software-based approach with the determinism and performance of embedded RF frontends. RFquack is based on a multi-radio hardware system with swappable RF frontends, and a firmware that exposes a uniform, hardware-agnostic API. RFquack focuses on a structured firmware architecture that allows high- and low-level interaction with the RF frontends. It facilitates the development of host-side scripts and firmware plug-ins, to implement efficient data-processing pipelines or interactive protocols, thanks to the multi-radio support. RFquack has an IPython shell and 9 firmware modules for: spectrum scanning, automatic carrier detection and bitrate estimation, headless operation with remote management, in-flight packet filtering and manipulation, MouseJack, and RollJam (as examples). We used RFquack to setup RF hacking contests, analyze industrial-grade devices and key fobs, on which we found and reported 11 vulnerabilities in their RF protocols.
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