补贴普惠保险以减少贫困
Subsidising Inclusive Insurance to Reduce Poverty
AI总结：
本文通过破产理论模型评估政府与私人保险公司合作下的小额保险补贴方案，发现补贴计划能在降低政府成本的同时最大化减贫社会效益。
摘要：
在本文中，我们评估了政府与私人保险公司之间协调与合作的益处，并进一步提供了小额保险产品作为实现减贫的强大且具有成本效益的工具的证据。为了探索这些想法，我们从破产理论的角度对家庭资本进行建模，以衡量小额保险对贫困动态的影响以及政府社会保护的成本。我们在四种框架下分析该模型：未投保、投保（无补贴）、投保且享有补贴的固定保费、投保且享有补贴的灵活保费。尽管仅靠保险（无补贴）可能不足以降低特定家庭群体陷入贫困区域的可能性，因为保费支付限制了其资本增长，但我们的分析表明，补贴计划可以在降低政府成本的同时提供最大的社会效益。
英文摘要：
In this article, we assess the benefits of coordination and partnerships between governments and private insurers, and provide further evidence for microinsurance products as powerful and cost-effective tools for achieving poverty reduction. To explore these ideas, we model the capital of a household from a ruin-theoretic perspective to measure the impact of microinsurance on poverty dynamics and the governmental cost of social protection. We analyse the model under four frameworks: uninsured, insured (without subsidies), insured with subsidised constant premiums and insured with subsidised flexible premiums. Although insurance alone (without subsidies) may not be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of falling into the area of poverty for specific groups of households, since premium payments constrain their capital growth, our analysis suggests that subsidised schemes can provide maximum social benefits while reducing governmental costs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
