个人利他主义无法克服全球流行病博弈中的拥塞效应
Individual Altruism Cannot Overcome Congestion Effects in a Global Pandemic Game
摘要：
应对COVID-19等公共卫生危机的一个关键挑战是难以预测疾病与社会之间相互反馈的结果。作为理解这些相互联系的一步，我们提出了一个简单的全球流行病的博弈论模型，其中个人可以选择在哪里生活，我们调查的全球行为，可能出现的结果，个人在当地的隔离和感染的竞争成本的反应。我们研究的博弈论的均衡，从这个设置时，人口是由自私或利他的个人。首先，我们证明了在这些类型的游戏中，自私的均衡一般不是最优的，但所有稳定的自私均衡都在一个恒定的最优因子内。第二，存在无限多个稳定的利他主义均衡;除了有限个之外，所有这些均衡都比最糟糕的自私均衡更糟糕，并且利他主义均衡的社会成本是无限的。我们的工作是在鲜明的对比，最近的工作在网络拥塞游戏中，所有利他主义的均衡是社会最优的。这表明，没有中央协调的群体可能对大流行病的反应非常差，而个人利他主义甚至可能加剧问题。
英文摘要：
A key challenge in responding to public health crises such as COVID-19 is the difficulty of predicting the results of feedback interconnections between the disease and society. As a step towards understanding these interconnections, we pose a simple game-theoretic model of a global pandemic in which individuals can choose where to live, and we investigate the global behavior that may emerge as a result of individuals reacting locally to the competing costs of isolation and infection. We study the game-theoretic equilibria that emerge from this setup when the population is composed of either selfish or altruistic individuals. First, we demonstrate that as is typical in these types of games, selfish equilibria are in general not optimal, but that all stable selfish equilibria are within a constant factor of optimal. Second, there exist infinitely-many stable altruistic equilibria; all but finitely-many of these are worse than the worst selfish equilibrium, and the social cost of altruistic equilibria is unbounded. Our work is in sharp contrast to recent work in network congestion games in which all altruistic equilibria are socially optimal. This suggests that a population without central coordination may react very poorly to a pandemic, and that individual altruism could even exacerbate the problem.
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