基于遗传算法的非对称Blotto博弈求解
A Genetic Algorithm approach to Asymmetrical Blotto Games with Heterogeneous Valuations
摘要:
布洛托博弈是一种流行的多维战略资源分配模型。两名玩家在拍卖环境中分配不同战场的资源。虽然人们对预算平等的竞争有了很好的理解,但对资源不对称下的战略行为却知之甚少。我们引入了一个遗传算法,搜索启发式的启发,从生物进化,解释为社会学习,来解决这个问题。大多数绩效策略被结合起来,创造出更多的绩效策略。突变允许算法有效地扫描可能策略的空间,并考虑各种各样的偏差。我们证明了我们的遗传算法收敛到对称Blotto博弈的解析纳什均衡。我们提出的解决方案的概念,它提供了不对称的Blotto游戏。它特别注意到“游击战”战略的出现,这与经验和实验结果是一致的。资源较少的参与者学会集中资源来补偿竞争的不对称性。当局中人对战场的评价不一致时,对抗策略和竞价焦点是在均衡中得到的。这些特征与实证和实验结果相一致,并为其存在提供了学习基础。
英文摘要:
Blotto Games are a popular model of multi-dimensional strategic resource allocation. Two players allocate resources in different battlefields in an auction setting. While competition with equal budgets is well understood, little is known about strategic behavior under asymmetry of resources. We introduce a genetic algorithm, a search heuristic inspired from biological evolution, interpreted as social learning, to solve this problem. Most performant strategies are combined to create more performant strategies. Mutations allow the algorithm to efficiently scan the space of possible strategies, and consider a wide diversity of deviations. We show that our genetic algorithm converges to the analytical Nash equilibrium of the symmetric Blotto game. We present the solution concept it provides for asymmetrical Blotto games. It notably sees the emergence of "guerilla warfare" strategies, consistent with empirical and experimental findings. The player with less resources learns to concentrate its resources to compensate for the asymmetry of competition. When players value battlefields heterogeneously, counter strategies and bidding focus is obtained in equilibrium. These features are consistent with empirical and experimental findings, and provide a learning foundation for their existence.
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