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arXiv 2103.14254math.OC
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分布式能源的有效聚合

On Efficient Aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources

Zuguang Gao, Khaled Alshehri, John R. Birge

摘要:

分布式能源(DER)的快速扩张是世界各地电力系统最重要的变化之一。DER的例子包括太阳能电池板,小型天然气发电机,热电联产厂等,由于这些DER的供应能力很小,直接参与电力批发市场是不切实际的。在本文中,我们研究了一个有效的聚合模型,其中利润最大化的聚合器从DER采购电力,并在批发市场上出售。聚合器和DER所有者之间的相互作用被建模为Stackelberg游戏:聚合器采用两部分定价,宣布参与费和每单位采购价格为每个DER所有者,和DER所有者通过选择她的回报最大化的能源供应。我们表明,我们提出的模型保留了充分的市场效率,即,聚集模型实现的社会福利与DER直接参与批发市场的社会福利相同。我们还注意到,两部分定价是市场效率的关键,并通过一个例子说明,与一部分定价,将有一个效率损失从DER聚合,由于追求利润的行为的聚合。

英文摘要:

The rapid expansion of distributed energy resources (DERs) is one of the most significant changes to electricity systems around the world. Examples of DERs include solar panels, small natural gas-fueled generators, combined heat and power plants, etc. Due to the small supply capacities of these DERs, it is impractical for them to participate directly in the wholesale electricity market. We study in this paper an efficient aggregation model where a profit-maximizing aggregator procures electricity from DERs, and sells them in the wholesale market. The interaction between the aggregator and the DER owners is modeled as a Stackelberg game: the aggregator adopts two-part pricing by announcing a participation fee and a per-unit price of procurement for each DER owner, and the DER owner responds by choosing her payoff-maximizing energy supplies. We show that our proposed model preserves full market efficiency, i.e., the social welfare achieved by the aggregation model is the same as that when DERs participate directly in the wholesale market. We also note that two-part pricing is critical for market efficiency, and illustrate via an example that with one-part pricing, there will be an efficiency loss from DER aggregation, due to the profit-seeking behavior of the aggregator.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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