动态和反应环境中的鲁棒随机稳定性
Robust Stochastic Stability in Dynamic and Reactive Environments
摘要:
博弈中的学习理论已经广泛地研究了代理通过优化固定的效用函数来动态地相互响应的情况。然而,在许多感兴趣的设置中,代理效用函数本身因过去的代理选择而变化。持续的COVID-19疫情提供了一个例子:一种高度流行的病毒可能会激励个人佩戴口罩,但广泛佩戴口罩会降低病毒流行率,从而降低个人佩戴口罩的激励。本文开发了一个通用的框架,使用概率耦合方法,可以用来推导出随机稳态的对数线性学习在某些游戏,这种游戏环境反馈功能。作为一个案例研究,我们将这个框架应用到一个简单的动态博弈模型的社会预防措施在流行病,并给出条件下,最大限度地谨慎的社会行为在这个模型是随机稳定的。
英文摘要:
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in many settings of interest, agent utility functions themselves vary as a result of past agent choices. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic provides an example: a highly prevalent virus may incentivize individuals to wear masks, but extensive adoption of mask-wearing reduces virus prevalence which in turn reduces individual incentives for mask-wearing. This paper develops a general framework using probabilistic coupling methods that can be used to derive the stochastically stable states of log-linear learning in certain games which feature such game-environment feedback. As a case study, we apply this framework to a simple dynamic game-theoretic model of social precautions in an epidemic and give conditions under which maximally cautious social behavior in this model is stochastically stable.
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