鲁莽的猎物和耐心的捕食者的共同进化
Coevolution of the reckless prey and the patient predator
摘要：
博弈论中的消耗战是两个对手之间的对峙局面的模型，胜利者取决于其持续性。我们模拟了捕食者和猎物之间的对峙，当猎物躲藏起来，捕食者等待猎物从避难所出来，或者当两者被锁定在相互威胁伤害甚至死亡的情况下。当捕食者放弃或猎物试图逃跑时，对峙就结束了。而不是使用不对称的消耗战，我们嵌入的对峙作为一个组成部分的Rosenzweig和MacArthur的捕食者-猎物模型来自第一原则。应用自适应动力学方法研究了食饵和捕食者放弃率的协同进化问题。我们发现，长期的进化过程导致三个性质不同的情况：捕食者立即放弃，而猎物永远不会放弃;捕食者永远不会放弃，而猎物采取任何放弃率大于或等于一个给定的正阈值;捕食者灭绝。我们观察到，有些结果与非对称消耗战相同，但其他结果则大不相同。
英文摘要：
The war of attrition in game theory is a model of a stand-off situation between two opponents where the winner is determined by its persistence. We model a stand-off between a predator and a prey when the prey is hiding and the predator is waiting for the prey to come out from its refuge, or when the two are locked in a situation of mutual threat of injury or even death. The stand-off is resolved when the predator gives up or when the prey tries to escape. Instead of using the asymmetric war of attrition, we embed the stand-off as an integral part of the predator-prey model of Rosenzweig and MacArthur derived from first principles. We apply this model to study the coevolution of the giving-up rates of the prey and the predator, using the adaptive dynamics approach. We find that the long term evolutionary process leads to three qualitatively different scenarios: the predator gives up immediately, while the prey never gives up; the predator never gives up, while the prey adopts any giving-up rate greater than or equal to a given positive threshold value; the predator goes extinct. We observe that some results are the same as for the asymmetric war of attrition, but others are quite different.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
