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arXiv 2103.12429physics.hist-phgr-qchep-th
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关于邪恶博士的贝叶斯观点

A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario

Feraz Azhar, Alan H. Guth, Mohammad Hossein Namjoo

摘要:

在《用自我定位信念打败邪恶博士》一书中,亚当·埃尔加提出并捍卫了自我定位信念的无差异原则:如果一个人确信他的世界中有不止一个人处于主观上与他自己无法区分的状态,那么他应该对他是这些人中的任何一个的假设给予同等的信任。通过一系列的思想实验,埃尔加实际上声称他可以推导出在这种情况下应该应用的信任函数,从而证明了他的无差别原则。在这里,我们使用贝叶斯方法来论证,埃尔加的推理是循环的:在分析他的第三个思想实验时,他使用了一个断言,只有当一个人从一开始就假设他试图证明的无差别原则时,这个断言才是合理的。我们同意Elga的观点,即在没有任何理由分配不平等的信用的情况下,平等信用的假设是一个非常合理的原则,但我们不同意信用的平等可以这样推导出来。

英文摘要:

In "Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief", Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga's reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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