arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2103.05833cs.CR
收藏

利用 Mixup 增强基于深度学习的侧信道攻击

Towards Strengthening Deep Learning-based Side Channel Attacks with Mixup

Zhimin Luo, Mengce Zheng, Ping Wang, Minhui Jin, Jiajia Zhang, Honggang Hu

AI总结:

本文首次将 mixup 数据增强引入基于深度学习的侧信道攻击,在建模迹不足时扩充训练集,实验证明其能显著提升攻击性能并减少所需攻击迹,同时发现最低有效位泄漏模型优于常用模型。

摘要:

近年来,各种深度学习技术已被用于侧信道攻击,期望获得更可观的攻击结果。其中大多数工作集中于改进网络架构或提出新算法,并假设有足够的建模迹(profiling traces)可用于训练合适的神经网络。然而,在实际场景中,建模迹可能不足,这会使网络学习不充分,并损害攻击性能。本文研究了一种称为 mixup 的数据增强技术,并首次提出将其用于基于深度学习的侧信道攻击,目的是扩充建模集并增加成功实施攻击的机会。我们对生成的迹和原始迹进行相关能量分析(Correlation Power Analysis),发现二者在泄漏信息方面存在一致性。实验表明,mixup 确实能够提升攻击性能,尤其是在建模迹不足的情况下。具体而言,当训练集规模减少到原始集合的 30% 时,mixup 可以显著减少所需的攻击迹数量。我们测试了三个 mixup 参数值,并得出结论:总体上它们都能带来改进。此外,我们比较了三种泄漏模型,并意外发现最低有效位模型(least significant bit model)在以往工作中使用较少,但在攻击结果上实际上优于常见的恒等模型(identity model)和汉明重量模型(hamming weight model)。

英文摘要:

In recent years, various deep learning techniques have been exploited in side channel attacks, with the anticipation of obtaining more appreciable attack results. Most of them concentrate on improving network architectures or putting forward novel algorithms, assuming that there are adequate profiling traces available to train an appropriate neural network. However, in practical scenarios, profiling traces are probably insufficient, which makes the network learn deficiently and compromises attack performance. In this paper, we investigate a kind of data augmentation technique, called mixup, and first propose to exploit it in deep-learning based side channel attacks, for the purpose of expanding the profiling set and facilitating the chances of mounting a successful attack. We perform Correlation Power Analysis for generated traces and original traces, and discover that there exists consistency between them regarding leakage information. Our experiments show that mixup is truly capable of enhancing attack performance especially for insufficient profiling traces. Specifically, when the size of the training set is decreased to 30% of the original set, mixup can significantly reduce acquired attacking traces. We test three mixup parameter values and conclude that generally all of them can bring about improvements. Besides, we compare three leakage models and unexpectedly find that least significant bit model, which is less frequently used in previous works, actually surpasses prevalent identity model and hamming weight model in terms of attack results.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑