潘多拉魔盒问题的竞争性信息设计
Competitive Information Design for Pandora's Box
AI总结：
本文研究潘多拉魔盒问题的竞争性信息设计变体，刻画了智能体最优策略、对称环境下的纯对称均衡，还揭示了信息竞争相关洞见与盒子信息量和智能体效用的内在联系。
摘要：
我们研究了著名的潘多拉魔盒（Pandora's Box）问题（Weitzman, 1979）的一类自然的竞争性信息设计策略变体，其中每个盒子都对应一名策略性信息发送者，发送者可以设计当智能体检查盒子时，关于盒子奖品价值的哪些信息会被披露给智能体。这类存在策略性盒子的变体，是受潘多拉魔盒问题在现实中广泛的经济应用启发而提出的。我们的贡献分为三方面：（1）给定各盒子的信息策略，我们刻画了智能体的最优搜索与停止策略；（2）在对称环境下，我们完整刻画了盒子间竞争性信息披露博弈的纯对称均衡；（3）我们揭示了关于信息竞争以及均衡下智能体最终收益的诸多洞见，此外，我们通过建立任意盒子的价值分布的信息量与搜索智能体的效用排序之间的内在联系，研究了潘多拉魔盒的信息性质。
英文摘要：
We study a natural competitive-information-design strategic variant for the celebrated Pandora's Box problem (Weitzman, 1979), where each box is associated with a strategic information sender who can design what information about the box's prize value to be revealed to the agent when the agent inspects the box. This variant with strategic boxes is motivated by a wide range of real-world economic applications for Pandora's Box. Our contributions are three-fold: (1) given the boxes' information policies, we characterize the agent's optimal search and stopping strategy; (2) we fully characterize the pure symmetric equilibrium for the game of boxes' competitive information revelation in a symmetric environment; and (3) we reveal various insights regarding information competition and the resultant agent payoff at equilibrium, and additionally, we study informational properties of Pandora's Box by establishing an intrinsic connection between informativeness of any box's value distribution and the utility order of the search agent.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
