指环王:对CPU片上环形互连的侧信道攻击是可行的
Lord of the Ring(s): Side Channel Attacks on the CPU On-Chip Ring Interconnect Are Practical
摘要:
我们介绍了第一个微架构的侧信道攻击,利用竞争的CPU环互连。有两个挑战使得利用这一渠道变得非常困难。首先,人们对环形互连的功能和架构知之甚少。第二,攻击者通过环竞争可以学习到的信息本质上是有噪声的,并且具有粗糙的空间粒度。为了解决第一个挑战,我们执行一个彻底的逆向工程的复杂的协议,处理环互连上的通信。有了这些知识,我们建立了一个跨核心的隐蔽通道,从一个单一的线程,最大的跨核心通道不依赖于共享内存的能力超过4 Mbps的环互连。为了解决第二个挑战,我们利用细粒度的时间模式的环争用推断受害者程序的秘密。我们演示了我们的攻击,从易受攻击的EdDSA和RSA实现中提取关键位,以及推断受害者用户键入的密码的精确时间。
英文摘要:
We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this channel. First, little is known about the ring interconnect's functioning and architecture. Second, information that can be learned by an attacker through ring contention is noisy by nature and has coarse spatial granularity. To address the first challenge, we perform a thorough reverse engineering of the sophisticated protocols that handle communication on the ring interconnect. With this knowledge, we build a cross-core covert channel over the ring interconnect with a capacity of over 4 Mbps from a single thread, the largest to date for a cross-core channel not relying on shared memory. To address the second challenge, we leverage the fine-grained temporal patterns of ring contention to infer a victim program's secrets. We demonstrate our attack by extracting key bits from vulnerable EdDSA and RSA implementations, as well as inferring the precise timing of keystrokes typed by a victim user.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。