转环：硬化WebAssembly以对抗Spectre
Swivel: Hardening WebAssembly against Spectre
摘要：
我们描述了Swivel，一个新的编译器框架，用于加固WebAssembly（Wasm）以抵御Spectre攻击。在浏览器之外，Wasm已经成为一个流行的轻量级进程内沙箱，例如，用于生产中隔离边缘云和功能即服务平台上的不同客户端。不幸的是，Spectre攻击可以绕过Wasm的隔离保证。Swivel通过确保潜在的恶意代码既不能使用Spectre攻击来突破Wasm沙箱，也不能强迫受害者代码（另一个Wasm客户端或嵌入进程）泄漏机密数据，从而加强了Wasm对此类攻击的抵抗能力。我们描述了两种Swivel设计，一种是可以在现有CPU上使用的纯软件方法，另一种是使用英特尔第11代CPU中可用的扩展的硬件辅助方法。对于这两种情况，我们评估了一种减轻Spectre的随机方法和一种完全消除Spectre的确定性方法。我们的随机实现强加下10.3%的开销WASM兼容的SPEC 2006子集，而我们的确定性实现强加的开销在3.3%和240.2%之间。虽然在一些基准上很高，但Swivel的开销仍然比依赖管道围栏的现有防御小9倍到36.3倍。
英文摘要：
We describe Swivel, a new compiler framework for hardening WebAssembly (Wasm) against Spectre attacks. Outside the browser, Wasm has become a popular lightweight, in-process sandbox and is, for example, used in production to isolate different clients on edge clouds and function-as-a-service platforms. Unfortunately, Spectre attacks can bypass Wasm's isolation guarantees. Swivel hardens Wasm against this class of attacks by ensuring that potentially malicious code can neither use Spectre attacks to break out of the Wasm sandbox nor coerce victim code-another Wasm client or the embedding process-to leak secret data. We describe two Swivel designs, a software-only approach that can be used on existing CPUs, and a hardware-assisted approach that uses extension available in Intel 11th generation CPUs. For both, we evaluate a randomized approach that mitigates Spectre and a deterministic approach that eliminates Spectre altogether. Our randomized implementations impose under 10.3% overhead on the Wasm-compatible subset of SPEC 2006, while our deterministic implementations impose overheads between 3.3% and 240.2%. Though high on some benchmarks, Swivel's overhead is still between 9x and 36.3x smaller than existing defenses that rely on pipeline fences.
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