论最优集选择中的精英制度
On Meritocracy in Optimal Set Selection
摘要:
通常,优点是相对于一些内在的价值衡量来定义的。相反,我们考虑个人价值为\emph{relative}的设置:当决策者(DM)从群体中选择一组个体以最大化预期效用时,很自然地会考虑每个人对效用的\emph{Expected Marginal Contribution}(EMC)。我们表明,这一概念满足公理定义的公平性,这种设置。我们还表明,对于某些政策结构,这一概念的公平性与期望效用最大化,而线性效用函数是相同的Shapley值。然而,对于某些自然的政策,例如那些选择具有特定属性(例如大学入学考试分数足够高)的个人的政策,在精英统治和效用最大化之间存在权衡。我们分析了在挪威大学的大学招生和成果的基础上,在广泛的实验中的效用和公平的政策上的限制的效果。
英文摘要:
Typically, merit is defined with respect to some intrinsic measure of worth. We instead consider a setting where an individual's worth is \emph{relative}: when a Decision Maker (DM) selects a set of individuals from a population to maximise expected utility, it is natural to consider the \emph{Expected Marginal Contribution} (EMC) of each person to the utility. We show that this notion satisfies an axiomatic definition of fairness for this setting. We also show that for certain policy structures, this notion of fairness is aligned with maximising expected utility, while for linear utility functions it is identical to the Shapley value. However, for certain natural policies, such as those that select individuals with a specific set of attributes (e.g. high enough test scores for college admissions), there is a trade-off between meritocracy and utility maximisation. We analyse the effect of constraints on the policy on both utility and fairness in extensive experiments based on college admissions and outcomes in Norwegian universities.
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