arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2102.08985cs.CRcs.SYeess.SY
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扫描周期:PLC上基于时间的身份验证

Scanning the Cycle: Timing-based Authentication on PLCs

Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, Martin Ochoa, Jianying Zhou, Aditya Mathur

摘要:

可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)是工业控制系统(ICS)的核心部件。但是,如果PLC受到损害,或者通过网络从PLC发送的命令受到欺骗,后果可能是灾难性的。在这项工作中,提出了一种新的技术来验证PLC,旨在提高对强大的攻击者的酒吧,同时与实时系统兼容。所提出的技术捕获每个控制器在一个非侵入性的方式的定时信息。有人认为,扫描周期是一个独特的功能PLC,可以近似被动观察网络流量。欺骗PLC发出的命令的攻击者将偏离这种指纹。为了检测重放攻击,提出了一种PLC水印技术。PLC水印通过将输入/输出建模为PLC的请求/响应消息的函数来对扫描周期和控制逻辑之间的关系进行建模。所提出的技术进行了验证的业务水处理厂(SWaT)和智能电网(EPIC)的测试平台。实验结果表明,PLC可以区分基于其扫描周期的时序特性。

英文摘要:

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are a core component of an Industrial Control System (ICS). However, if a PLC is compromised or the commands sent across a network from the PLCs are spoofed, consequences could be catastrophic. In this work, a novel technique to authenticate PLCs is proposed that aims at raising the bar against powerful attackers while being compatible with real-time systems. The proposed technique captures timing information for each controller in a non-invasive manner. It is argued that Scan Cycle is a unique feature of a PLC that can be approximated passively by observing network traffic. An attacker that spoofs commands issued by the PLCs would deviate from such fingerprints. To detect replay attacks a PLC Watermarking technique is proposed. PLC Watermarking models the relationship between the scan cycle and the control logic by modeling the input/output as a function of request/response messages of a PLC. The proposed technique is validated on an operational water treatment plant (SWaT) and smart grid (EPIC) testbed. Results from experiments indicate that PLCs can be distinguished based on their scan cycle timing characteristics.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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