Stackelberg-Pareto综合（完整版）
Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis (Full Version)
摘要：
在本文中，我们研究了两个球员的Stackelberg游戏的框架，在图中，球员0宣布一个战略和球员1合理的反应与战略，是一个最佳的反应。虽然通常假设参与人1只有一个目标，但我们在这里考虑一个新的设置，他有几个目标。在这种情况下，在用他的策略做出回应后，参与人1得到了一个对应于他满意的目标的布尔向量形式的回报。参与人1的理性表现为，在参与人0的策略下，他的反应必须产生帕累托最优收益.我们研究了斯塔克伯格-帕累托综合问题，该问题询问参与人0是否可以宣布一个满足其目标的策略，无论参与人1的理性反应如何。对于游戏中的目标是所有的奇偶校验或所有的可达性目标，我们表明，这个问题是固定参数易处理和NEXPTIME完成。在可达性目标和树图的简单情况下，这个问题已经是NP完全的。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that Player 1 has a single objective, we consider here the new setting where he has several. In this context, after responding with his strategy, Player 1 gets a payoff in the form of a vector of Booleans corresponding to his satisfied objectives. Rationality of Player 1 is encoded by the fact that his response must produce a Pareto-optimal payoff given the strategy of Player 0. We study the Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis problem which asks whether Player 0 can announce a strategy which satisfies his objective, whatever the rational response of Player 1. For games in which objectives are either all parity or all reachability objectives, we show that this problem is fixed-parameter tractable and NEXPTIME-complete. This problem is already NP-complete in the simple case of reachability objectives and graphs that are trees.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
