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arXiv 2101.03593math.LO
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科学发现的(相关)逻辑

The (Relevant) Logic of Scientific Discovery

Timothy Childers, Ondrej Majer, Peter Milne

摘要:

本文提出了一个彻底的解释弱相关逻辑建立在Dunn-Belnap四值语义的知识生产(实验室)的网站网络中的信息沟通。所传达的知识涉及实验数据和使用它进行测试的结果。已经有许多类似于我们的解释-例如,Dunn(1976),Belnap(1977)。Bilkova等人(2010)概述了实验室判读。我们的系统是建立在相关的逻辑配备了一个四值的公式,实验室的立场,在情况下,和四个值反映了评估实验结果的复杂性的B-Meyer语义。这种语义避免了使用Buckley星,代价是引入了进一步的关系,这是在评估蕴涵的虚假性分配时所需要的。然而,我们可以提供两个可及性关系的自然解释-在我们的实验室设置中,假设的确认和反驳是两个独立的过程。这种设置激发了可访问性关系的各种基本属性,以及许多其他可能的限制。这给了我们一个灵活的模块化系统,可以调整到特定的认识背景。由于完美的概率很少,或者可能从来没有,实际上观察到,我们添加概率的逻辑框架。由于我们的逻辑框架是非经典的,概率也是非经典的,满足一个较弱版本的柯尔莫哥洛夫公理(参见。Priest 2006)。我们表明,这些概率允许一个频率,以及一个主观的解释(我们提供了一个荷兰书的论点)。我们进一步展示了如何更新概率和区分条件概率和条件概率。

英文摘要:

This paper presents a thoroughgoing interpretation of a weak relevant logic built over the Dunn-Belnap four-valued semantics in terms of the communication of information in a network of sites of knowledge production (laboratories). The knowledge communicated concerns experimental data and the regularities tested using it. There have been many nods to interpretations similar to ours - for example, in Dunn (1976), Belnap (1977). The laboratory interpretation was outlined in Bilkova et al. (2010). Our system is built on the Routley--Meyer semantics for relevant logic equipped with a four-valued valuation of formulas, where labs stand in for situations, and the four values reflect the complexity of assessing results of experiments. This semantics avoids using the Routley star, on the cost of introducing a further relation, required in evaluating falsity assignments of implication. We can however provide a natural interpretation of two accessibility relations - confirmation and refutation of hypotheses are two independent processes in our laboratory setup. This setup motivates various basic properties of the accessibility relations, as well as a number of other possible restrictions. This gives us a flexible modular system which can be adjusted to specific epistemic contexts. As perfect regularities are rarely, or perhaps never, actually observed, we add probabilities to the logical framework. As our logical framework is non-classical, the probability is non-classical as well, satisfying a weaker version of Kolmogorov axioms (cf. Priest 2006). We show that these probabilities allow for a relative frequency as well as for a subjective interpretation (we provide a Dutch book argument). We further show how to update the probabilities and to distinguish conditional probabilities from the probability of conditionals.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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