进化稳定规范:理论与应用
Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications
摘要:
为了解释有偏推论的持续性,我们提出了一个框架,以评估竞争(错误)规格在战略设置。代理与异构(MIS)规范共存,并通过反复播放得出贝叶斯推断他们的环境。(错误)规范的相对稳定性取决于其追随者的均衡收益。一个关键的机制是学习通道:由于推理而感知到的最佳回答的内隐性。我们描述了一个理性的社会只容易受到通过学习渠道的一些错误规范的入侵。学习通道导致新的稳定现象,并可以赋予进化优势,否则有害的偏见在经济相关的应用。
英文摘要:
Toward explaining the persistence of biased inferences, we propose a framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic settings. Agents with heterogeneous (mis)specifications coexist and draw Bayesian inferences about their environment through repeated play. The relative stability of (mis)specifications depends on their adherents' equilibrium payoffs. A key mechanism is the learning channel: the endogeneity of perceived best replies due to inference. We characterize when a rational society is only vulnerable to invasion by some misspecification through the learning channel. The learning channel leads to new stability phenomena, and can confer an evolutionary advantage to otherwise detrimental biases in economically relevant applications.
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