自私概念之间的指数传播分离
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness
摘要：
我们考虑的问题，实现一个固定的社会之间的选择功能的多个球员（它需要作为输入的类型$t_i$从每个球员$i$和输出结果$f(t_1,\ldots, t_n)$），其中每个球员必须被激励，以遵循协议。特别是，我们研究的通信要求的协议：（a）实现$f$，（b）实现$f$和计算付款，使其事后激励兼容（EPIC）遵循协议，和（c）实现$f$和计算付款的方式，使其主导策略激励兼容（DSIC）遵循协议。我们展示了这三个量之间的指数分离，已经是两个参与者的情况了。也就是说，我们首先构建一个$f$，使得$f$可以在通信$c$中实现，但是$f$的任何EPIC实现（具有任何支付选择）都需要通信$\exp(c)$。这回答了[FS 09，BBS 13]的一个开放问题。第二，我们构造一个$f$，这样一个EPIC协议实现$f$与通信$C$，但所有DSIC实现的$f$需要通信$\exp(C)$。
英文摘要：
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type $t_i$ from each player $i$ and outputs an outcome $f(t_1,\ldots, t_n)$), in which each player must be incentivized to follow the protocol. In particular, we study the communication requirements of a protocol which: (a) implements $f$, (b) implements $f$ and computes payments that make it ex-post incentive compatible (EPIC) to follow the protocol, and (c) implements $f$ and computes payments in a way that makes it dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) to follow the protocol. We show exponential separations between all three of these quantities, already for just two players. That is, we first construct an $f$ such that $f$ can be implemented in communication $c$, but any EPIC implementation of $f$ (with any choice of payments) requires communication $\exp(c)$. This answers an open question of [FS09, BBS13]. Second, we construct an $f$ such that an EPIC protocol implements $f$ with communication $C$, but all DSIC implementations of $f$ require communication $\exp(C)$.
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