Hongwei Shi, Shengling Wang, Qin Hu, Xiuzhen Cheng, Jianhui Huang
Bitcoin has witnessed a prevailing transition that employing transaction fees paid by users rather than subsidy assigned by the system as the main incentive for mining.
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In the Bitcoin system, miners are incentivized to join the system and validate transactions through fees paid by the users. A simple "pay your bid" auction has been employed to determine the transaction fees. Recently, Lavi, Sattath and Zohar [LSZ17] proposed an alternative fee design, called the monopolistic price (MP) mechanism, aimed at improving the revenue for the miners. Although MP is not strictly incentive compatible (IC), they studied how close to IC the mechanism is for iid distributions, and conjectured that it is nearly IC asymptotically based on extensive simulations and some anal…
The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: Users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin's challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin's pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the "monopolistic auction", showing: (i) its revenue…
A blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger. A fair blockchain is expected to have healthy metrics; high honest mining power, low processing latency, i.e., low wait times for transactions and stable price of consumption, i.e., the minimum transaction fee required to have a transaction processed. As Bitcoin matures, the influx of transactions increases and the block rewards become insignificant. We show that under these conditions, it becomes hard to maintain the health of the blockchain. In Bitcoin, under these mature operating conditions (MOC), th…
An Efficient Dynamic Transaction Storage Mechanism for Sustainable High Throughput Bitcoin
本文提出高效动态交易存储机制 EDTS，结合布谷鸟过滤器与动态交易存储策略，并利用 U-NSGA-III 优化，在交易手续费制度下实现 325.3 TPS 的可持续高吞吐量，性能优于比特币 NG。
Bitcoin After Block Rewards
本文通过序贯决策模型分析比特币矿工在区块奖励归零后仅依赖交易费时的激励兼容性，发现存在偏离阈值$G_t$，并评估了三种协议级机制（基础费、费用下限和自适应最大区块大小规则）的组合可提高阈值、缓解激励崩溃。
Off-chain transaction channels represent one of the leading techniques to scale the transaction throughput in cryptocurrencies. However, the economic effect of transaction channels on the system has not been explored much until now. We study the economics of Bitcoin transaction channels, and present a framework for an economic analysis of the lightning network and its effect on transaction fees on the blockchain. Our framework allows us to reason about different patterns of demand for transactions and different topologies of the lightning network, and to derive the resulting fees for transacti…
Greedy-Mine: A Profitable Mining Attack Strategy in Bitcoin-NG
针对 Bitcoin-NG 激励分析忽略顽固策略与鲸鱼交易诱因的问题，提出 Greedy-Mine 攻击并用 MDP 建模分析其获利条件，同时通过提高传播因子阈值增强协议安全性。
Mining processes of Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are currently incentivized with voluntary transaction fees and fixed block rewards which will halve gradually to zero. In the setting where optional and arbitrary transaction fee becomes the remaining incentive, Carlsten et al.\ [CCS~2016] find that an undercutting attack can become the equilibrium strategy for miners. In undercutting, the attacker deliberately forks an existing chain by leaving wealthy transactions unclaimed to attract petty complaint miners to its fork. We observe that two simplifying assumptions in [CCS~2016] of fees …
Smart Contracts and transactions allow users to implement elaborate constructions on cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Many of these constructions, including operational payment channels and atomic swaps, use a building block called Hashed Time-Locked Contract (HTLC). In this work, we distill from HTLC a specification (HTLC-Spec), and present an implementation called Mutual-Assured-Destruction Hashed Time-Locked Contract (MAD-HTLC). MAD-HTLC employs a novel approach of utilizing the existing blockchain operators, called miners, as part of the design. If a user misbehaves, M…
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We argue that this is due to the absence of a dominant strategy equilibrium in the current fee mechanism. We propose an alternative fee setting mechanism that is inspired by generalized second price auctions. The design of such a mechanism is challenging because miners can use any criteria for including transactions and can manipulate the results of the auction a…
Determining Blockchain Transaction Timing and Fee with Observable Mempools
本文研究了区块链中战略用户如何通过观察内存池确定交易时间和费用，分析了不同区块间隔分布下的最优策略。
Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
针对标准性质下加密货币交易费机制收益低的问题，本研究通过离散费用设计满足扩展性质且渐近收益最优的机制，还证明放宽性质后比特币TFM经显示原理可实现近似收益最优，并刻画了多物品防链下协议机制类别。
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a "dream" transaction fee mechanism (TFM), and explored whether such a mechanism existed. A dream TFM should satisfy 1) user incentive compatibility (UIC), i.e., truthful bidding should be a user's dominant strategy; 2) miner incentive compatibility (MIC), i.e., the miner's dominant strategy is to faithfully implement the prescribed mechanism; and 3) miner-user side contract proofness (SCP), i.e., no c…
The Autonomy of the Lightning Network: A Mathematical and Economic Proof of Structural Decoupling from BTC
本文通过数学建模、博弈论和复杂度分析证明，闪电网络在交易需求增长下与比特币基础层结构性解耦，形成了由流动性枢纽寡头主导、缺乏监管与结算保证的独立影子银行系统。
Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution
针对区块链并行执行中费用市场未区分存储键访问负载的问题，提出包含气体计算机制和交易费用机制的框架，并评估出加权面积与时间比例完工时间两种候选方案。
Selfish Mining under General Stochastic Rewards
本研究提出一般随机奖励模型，分析组合区块奖励与交易费下的自私挖矿盈利性，发现组合奖励使盈利所需算力降低22%，并给出解析计算方法。
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
本文通过机制设计研究区块链交易费用机制，提出两种激励相容性条件，证明EIP-1559满足这些条件，并引入“无小费机制”作为替代方案。
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market
本文针对区块链交易费波动问题提出动态标价机制，利用区块利用率和历史出价计算标价，并证明在需求稳定时该机制可近似福利最优且价格稳定。
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