arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2012.14524physics.soc-phcond-mat.stat-mech
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为什么当群体更聪明时,个人学习却能持续下去?

Why does individual learning endure when crowds are wiser?

Benoît de Courson, Léo Fitouchi, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Michael Benzaquen

摘要:

向他人学习的能力(社会学习)通常被认为是人类物种成功的原因。但是,如果社会学习确实比个人学习更有效(无论成本更低还是更准确),那么就提出了一个问题:为什么有人会从事个人信息搜索,这是社会学习有效性的必要条件。我们提出了一个进化模型来解决这个悖论,提供代理(i)的目标不仅是信息质量,而且还争夺观众和声望,(ii)不仅重视准确性,而且还奖励原创性-使他们能够减轻羊群效应。我们发现,在某些条件下(足够大的成功率的知情代理人和中间口味的流行),社会学习的更高的准确性和口味的原始意见是进化稳定的,在一个互利分工的劳动均衡。当这些条件得不到满足时,系统往往会趋向于相互不利的平衡。

英文摘要:

The ability to learn from others (social learning) is often deemed a cause of human species success. But if social learning is indeed more efficient (whether less costly or more accurate) than individual learning, it raises the question of why would anyone engage in individual information seeking, which is a necessary condition for social learning's efficacy. We propose an evolutionary model solving this paradox, provided agents (i) aim not only at information quality but also vie for audience and prestige, and (ii) do not only value accuracy but also reward originality -- allowing them to alleviate herding effects. We find that under some conditions (large enough success rate of informed agents and intermediate taste for popularity), both social learning's higher accuracy and the taste for original opinions are evolutionary-stable, within a mutually beneficial division of labour-like equilibrium. When such conditions are not met, the system most often converges towards mutually detrimental equilibria.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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