基于时间重影成像的量子密钥分发量子黑客感知
Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
摘要：
量子密钥分发（QKD）利用量子力学在远程用户之间产生安全的密钥比特。然而，理论模型和实际实现之间的差距，窃听者有机会截获秘密密钥。最阴险的攻击，被称为量子黑客，是那些使用QKD系统的侧信道漏洞的测量结果没有显着差异的攻击。描述量子信号、量子信道和QKD系统的全时间尺度特性可以为合法用户提供额外的能力来击败恶意攻击。首次提出了利用时间指纹探测时间鬼像（TGI）方案来感知量子黑客攻击的方法，并通过实验验证了其有效性。该方案从信号和系统的新角度为提高量子密钥分配的实用安全性提供了一种通用的途径。
英文摘要：
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can generate secure key bits between remote users with quantum mechanics. However, the gap between the theoretical model and practical realizations gives eavesdroppers opportunities to intercept secret key. The most insidious attacks, known as quantum hacking, are the ones with no significant discrepancy of the measurement results using side-channel loopholes of QKD systems. Depicting full-time-scale characteristics of the quantum signals, the quantum channel, and the QKD system can provide legitimate users extra capabilities to defeat malicious attacks. For the first time, we propose the method exploring temporal ghost imaging (TGI) scheme to perceive quantum hacking with temporal fingerprints and experimentally verify its validity. The scheme presents a common approach to promote QKD's practical security from a new perspective of signals and systems.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
