Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used to study the exchange of resources among individuals, groups, or organizations. The role of individuals or connections in a network is described by a set of centrality metrics which represent one of the most important results of SNA. Degree, closeness, betweenness and clustering coefficient are the most used centrality measures. Their use is, however, severely hampered by their computation cost. This issue can be overcome by an algorithm called Game of Thieves (GoT). Thanks to this new algorithm, we can compute the importance of all elements in a network (i.e. vertices and edges), compared to the total number of vertices. This calculation is done not in a quadratic time, as when we use the classical methods, but in polylogarithmic time. Starting from this we present our results on the correlation existing between GoT and the most widely used centrality measures. From our experiments emerge that a strong correlation exists, which makes GoT eligible as a centrality measure for large scale complex networks.
The importance of a node in a social network is identified through a set of measures called centrality. Degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient are the most frequently used metrics to compute node centrality. Their computational complexity in some cases makes unfeasible, when not practically impossible, their computations. For this reason we focused on two alternative measures, WERW-Kpath and Game of Thieves, which are at the same time highly descriptive and computationally affordable. Our experiments show that a strong correlation exists betw…
The position value, introduced by Meessen (1988), is a solution concept for cooperative games in which the value assigned to a player depends on the value of the connections or links he has with other players. This concept has been studied by Borm et al. (1992) and characterised by Slikker (2005). In this paper, we analyse the position value from the point of view of the typical properties of a measure of centrality in a social network. We extend the analysis already developed in Gomez et al. (2003) for the Myerson centrality measure, where the symmetric effect on the centralities of the end n…
Among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which quantify the importance of every node in the network. This centrality analysis typically disregards the possibility that the network may have been deliberately manipulated to mislead the analysis. To solve this problem, a recent study attempted to understand how a member of a social network could rewire the connections therein to avoid being identified as a leader of that network. However, the study was based on the assumption that the network analyzer - the seeker - is oblivious to any evasion attempts…
In social network analysis, there is a common perception that influence is relevant to determine the global behavior of the society and thus it can be used to enforce cooperation by targeting an adequate initial set of individuals or to analyze global choice processes. Here we propose centrality measures that can be used to analyze the relevance of the actors in process related to spread of influence. In [39] it was considered a multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task depending on the perception of the willingness to perform the task of other individuals. T…
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each coalition of nodes is determined by certain graph properties. Next, the centrality of any individual node is determined by a chosen game-theoretic solution concept (notably, the Shapley value) in the same way as the payoff of a player in a cooperative game. On one hand, the advantage of game-theoretic centrality measures is that nodes are ranked not only ac…
We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added adjacent edge. We simulate the interactions between players using an algorithm that factors in rational strategic behavior based on a common objective function. The resulting networks exhibit pairwise stability, from which we derive necessary stable conditions for specific graph topologies. We then expand the model to simulate non-trivial games with large numbers o…
The Bonacich centrality is a well-known measure of the relative importance of nodes in a network. This notion is, for example, at the core of Google's PageRank algorithm. In this paper we study a network formation game where each player corresponds to a node in the network to be formed and can decide how to rewire his m out-links aiming at maximizing his own Bonacich centrality, which is his utility function. We study the Nash equilibria (NE) and the best response dynamics of this game and we provide a complete classification of the set of NE when m=1 and a fairly complete classification of th…
Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living organisms. Both network topology and the initial position of cooperators heavily affect the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel simulation program package, called 'NetworGame', which is able to simulate any type of social dilemma games on any model, or real world networks with any assignment of initial cooperation or defection strategies to network nodes. The ability of initially defecting single nodes to break overall cooperation was called as 'game centrality'. The efficiency of this …
We study network centrality based on dynamic influence propagation models in social networks. To illustrate our integrated mathematical-algorithmic approach for understanding the fundamental interplay between dynamic influence processes and static network structures, we focus on two basic centrality measures: (a) Single Node Influence (SNI) centrality, which measures each node's significance by its influence spread; and (b) Shapley Centrality, which uses the Shapley value of the influence spread function --- formulated based on a fundamental cooperative-game-theoretical concept --- to measure …
This paper introduces the Banzhaf and Banzhaf-Owen values as novel centrality measures for ranking terrorists in a network. This new approach let integrate the complete topology (i.e. nodes and edges) of the network and a coalitional structure on the nodes of the network. More precisely, the characteristics of the nodes (e.g., terrorists) of the network and their possible relationships (e.g., types of communication links), as well as coalitional information (e.g. level of hierarchies) independent of the network. First, for both centrality measures, we provide approximation algorithms and the c…
This paper proposes a family of network centralities called fixed-point centralities. This centrality family is defined via the fixed point of permutation equivariant mappings related to the underlying network. Such a centrality notion is immediately extended to define fixed-point centralities for infinite graphs characterized by graphons. Variation bounds of such centralities with respect to the variations of the underlying graphs and graphons under mild assumptions are established. Fixed-point centralities connect with a variety of different models on networks including graph neural networks…
In this paper, we present a framework for studying the following fundamental question in network analysis: How should one assess the centralities of nodes in an information/influence propagation process over a social network? Our framework systematically extends a family of classical graph-theoretical centrality formulations, including degree centrality, harmonic centrality, and their "sphere-of-influence" generalizations, to influence-based network centralities. We further extend natural group centralities from graph models to influence models, since group cooperation is essential in social i…
Network immunization is an extensively recognized issue in several domains like virtual network security, public health and social media, to deal with the problem of node inoculation so as to minimize the transmission through the links existed in these networks. We aim to identify top ranked nodes to immunize networks, leading to control the outbreak of epidemics or misinformation. We consider group based centrality and define a heuristic objective criteria to establish the target of key nodes finding in network which if immunized result in essential network vulnerability. We propose a group b…
Predicting edges in networks is a key problem in social network analysis and involves reasoning about the relationships between nodes based on the structural properties of a network. In particular, link prediction can be used to analyse how a network will develop or - given incomplete information about relationships - to discover "missing" links. Our approach to this problem is rooted in cooperative game theory, where we propose a new, quasi-local approach (i.e., one which considers nodes within some radius k) that combines generalised group closeness centrality and semivalue interaction indic…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort profiles resulting from interactions among coalitions of agents). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of the network for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We show that our finding unifies (and strengthens) existing results in the literature. We also identify conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria for the subclasses of…
From the viewpoint of networks, a ranking system for players or teams in sports is equivalent to a centrality measure for sports networks, whereby a directed link represents the result of a single game. Previously proposed network-based ranking systems are derived from static networks, i.e., aggregation of the results of games over time. However, the score of a player (or team) fluctuates over time. Defeating a renowned player in the peak performance is intuitively more rewarding than defeating the same player in other periods. To account for this factor, we propose a dynamic variant of such a…
The North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics（北卡罗来纳科学与数学学院）
Our objective is to find the five best college sports coaches of past century for three different sports. We decided to look at men's basketball, football, and baseball. We wanted to use an approach that could definitively determine team skill from the games played, and then use a machine-learning algorithm to calculate the correct coach skills for each team in a given year. We created a networks-based model to calculate team skill from historical game data. A digraph was created for each year in each sport. Nodes represented teams, and edges represented a game played between two teams. The ar…
It is known that individuals in social networks tend to exhibit homophily (a.k.a. assortative mixing) in their social ties, which implies that they prefer bonding with others of their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon? Is it that such relations are more convenient and easier to maintain? Or are there also some more tangible benefits to be gained from this collective behaviour? The current work takes a game-theoretic perspective on this phenomenon, and studies the conditions under which different assortative mixing strategies lead to equilibrium in an evolving social networ…
Understanding real-world networks has been a core research endeavor throughout the last two decades. Network Creation Games are a promising approach for this from a game-theoretic perspective. In these games, selfish agents corresponding to nodes in a network strategically decide which links to form to optimize their centrality. Many versions have been introduced and analyzed, but none of them fits to modeling the evolution of social networks. In real-world social networks, connections are often established by recommendations from common acquaintances or by a chain of such recommendations. Thu…
A premise at a heart of network analysis is that entities in a network derive utilities from their connections. The {\em influence} of a seed set $S$ of nodes is defined as the sum over nodes $u$ of the {\em utility} of $S$ to $u$. {\em Distance-based} utility, which is a decreasing function of the distance from $S$ to $u$, was explored in several successful research threads from social network analysis and economics: Network formation games [Bloch andJackson 2007], Reachability-based influence [Richardson and Domingos 2002, Kempe et al. 2003], "threshold" influence [Gomez-Rodriguez et al. 201…
