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arXiv 2012.01946cs.CR
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我可以使用您的子域名吗?探索现代Web中的相关域攻击

Can I Take Your Subdomain? Exploring Related-Domain Attacks in the Modern Web

Marco Squarcina, Mauro Tempesta, Lorenzo Veronese, Stefano Calzavara, Matteo Maffei

摘要:

相关域攻击者控制其目标Web应用程序的兄弟域,例如,因为一个子域名被接管了尽管它们比传统的Web攻击者具有更大的能力,但相关域攻击者只受到研究界的有限关注。在本文中,我们首次定义和量化了相关域攻击者对Web应用程序安全性构成的威胁。特别是,我们首先澄清相关域攻击者可以通过不同的攻击向量获得的能力,显示相关域攻击者概念的不同实例值得关注。然后,我们研究这些功能如何被滥用,以损害Web应用程序的安全性集中在不同的角度,包括:cookie,CSP,CORS,postMessage和域放松。通过建立在这个框架上,我们报告了一个大规模的安全测量的前50k域从Tranco列表中,导致在887个站点中发现的漏洞,在那里我们量化了相关域攻击者对流行的Web应用程序构成的威胁。

英文摘要:

Related-domain attackers control a sibling domain of their target web application, e.g., as the result of a subdomain takeover. Despite their additional power over traditional web attackers, related-domain attackers received only limited attention by the research community. In this paper we define and quantify for the first time the threats that related-domain attackers pose to web application security. In particular, we first clarify the capabilities that related-domain attackers can acquire through different attack vectors, showing that different instances of the related-domain attacker concept are worth attention. We then study how these capabilities can be abused to compromise web application security by focusing on different angles, including: cookies, CSP, CORS, postMessage and domain relaxation. By building on this framework, we report on a large-scale security measurement on the top 50k domains from the Tranco list that led to the discovery of vulnerabilities in 887 sites, where we quantified the threats posed by related-domain attackers to popular web applications.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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