激励职业主义者
Motivating Careerists
AI总结：
本文研究政治组织如何通过绩效奖励机制激励职业主义者正确决策并努力执行，分析了信息结构对激励效果的影响，并探讨了政策 implications。
摘要：
激励职业主义者对政治组织来说具有挑战性。在没有明确合同的情况下，职业主义者往往迎合公众意见或上级的偏好。更糟糕的是，当被要求实施这些扭曲的决定时，他们倾向于减少必要的努力。我们通过分析职业主义者代理人如何在不同信息结构下履行这些角色来研究激励问题。重要的是，主任可以可信地承诺基于绩效的奖励方案来激励正确决策和努力执行。然而，此类方案只有在主任观察政策后果并远离执行细节时才可行。在此过程中，我们刻画了主任最优的信息结构。将理论发现付诸实践，我们探讨了激励结构及其政策含义。
英文摘要：
Motivating careerists is challenging for political organizations. Without explicit contracts, careerists often pander to public opinions or their superiors' preferences. Worse, when tasked with implementing these distorted decisions, they tend to underinvest in the necessary efforts. We analyze the motivation problem by examining how a careerist agent fulfills these roles on behalf of a principal across various information structures. Importantly, the principal can credibly commit to performance-based reward schemes to incentivize correct decisions and diligent implementation. However, such schemes are feasible only if the principal observes policy consequences while backing away from implementation details. Along the way, we characterize the principal-optimal information structure. Putting theoretical findings into practice, we explore the underlying incentive structures and their policy implications.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
