拾取对象机制
Pick-an-object Mechanisms
摘要:
我们引入了一个新的机制,单边匹配市场,表示挑选一个对象(PAO)机制。当通过PAO实现分配规则时,会要求座席从个性化菜单中选择对象。这些选择可能在以后被拒绝,并且这些代理呈现新菜单。当过程结束时,代理将被分配他们拾取的最后一个对象。我们的特点是分配规则,可以顺序化的PAO机制,以及可以实现一个强大的真实的平衡。我们证明使用的PAO,而不是直接的机制,表明其平衡行为是密切相关的一个明显的防策略(OSP)的机制,但实现常用的规则,如盖尔-沙普利DA和顶部的交易周期,这是不是OSP实现。我们运行实验室实验比较真实的行为时,使用PAO,OSP,和直接机制来实现不同的规则。这表明,代理更有可能表现出符合理论预测PAO和OSP实现比他们的直接同行。
英文摘要:
We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may be rejected later on, and these agents are presented with new menus. When the procedure ends, agents are assigned the last object they picked. We characterize the allocation rules that can be sequentialized by PAO mechanisms, as well as the ones that can be implemented in a robust truthful equilibrium. We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms, but implements commonly used rules, such as Gale-Shapley DA and top trading cycles, which are not OSP-implementable. We run laboratory experiments comparing truthful behavior when using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms to implement different rules. These indicate that agents are more likely to behave in line with the theoretical prediction under PAO and OSP implementations than their direct counterparts.
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